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PROSECUTING CREDITORS AND
PROTECTING CONSUMERS: CRACKING
DOWN ON CREDITORS THAT EXTORT
VIA DEBT CRIMINALIZATION
PRACTICES
CREOLA JOHNSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
Searching online for the words “consumer,” “arrested,” and “debtor’s
prison,” reveals numerous news stories about individuals who have been arrested
over unpaid credit card debt, payday loans, and other consumer debts. For
instance, Joy Ulhmeyer, while driving home to Richland, Minnesota, was
arrested during a traffic stop and spent sixteen hours in jail before discovering
that her arrest stemmed from unpaid credit card debt.1 Christina McHan, a Texas
resident, was arrested and spent a night in jail after Cash Biz filed a criminal
complaint against her for defaulting on a $200 payday loan.2 Similarly, Antonio
Walker was arrested during a traffic stop in Norfolk, Virginia.3 In a criminal
complaint filed against him, Colortyme claimed that Mr. Walker had failed to
return a dinette set after defaulting on his rent-to-own (RTO) payments.4 Even
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1. See Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2011, 4:40
PM), http://www.startribune.com/in-jail-for-being-in-debt/95692619 [https://perma.cc/7GK5-BFJV]
(reporting that “after 16 hours in limbo, jail officials fingerprinted Uhlmeyer and explained her offense—
missing a court hearing over an unpaid debt” and quoting her as saying “[t]hey have no right to do this
to me . . . [n]ot for a stupid credit card”).
2. See, e.g., Forrest Wilder, Fast Cash: How Taking Out a Payday Loan Could Land You in Jail,
TEX. OBSERVER (July 16, 2013, 11:49 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/cash-fast-how-taking-out-apayday-loan-could-land-you-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/GTP9-M2LZ].
3. Louis Hansen, Criminal Prosecutions Soar in Rent-To-Own Sector, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Apr. 11,
2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/04/criminal-prosecutions-soar-renttoown-sector [https://perma.cc/
QVZ6-V5L3]. Colortyme is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rent-A-Center, the largest RTO company
in the United States. Michael H. Anderson, An Economic Perspective on Subprime Lending, 89 CHI.KENT L. REV. 53, 56 (2013).
4. Anderson, supra note 3, at 56.
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though the criminal charges were later dropped, his boss, the driver during that
fateful traffic stop, fired Mr. Walker.5
This article describes the pervasive problem of companies and lenders
resorting to practices that criminalize consumers who default on payments of civil
debts. Such practices criminalize consumers by inducing terror in consumers of
being arrested for or charged with a crime related to their unpaid debts. Though
creditors contend they are merely engaged in debt collection, this article asserts
that such practices amount to extortion when they incite fear in consumers to get
them to pay past-due debts or relinquish ownership of assets.6
This article describes three types of criminalization practices: (1) threatening
to pursue prosecution of consumers for committing a crime; (2) filing police
reports to initiate criminal charges against consumers; and (3) misusing civil
contempt to obtain arrest warrants against consumers. Part II provides examples
of creditors that criminalize consumers by terrorizing them with threats that
conjure up images of their immediate arrest for theft-related crimes. For
example, in an enforcement action filed against a subprime auto lender and a car
title lender,7 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) alleged that
these lenders made threats to have consumers immediately arrested by using Skip
Tracy, a telephone spoofing technology that caused caller identification devices
to make it appear that the threatening calls were coming from various
investigation departments.8 Because creditors are using such threats to coerce
consumers into paying out of fear of being arrested, these threats constitute

5. Hansen, supra note 3.
6. Every state has a statute making certain conduct constitute the crime of extortion or coercion.
Richard W. Smith, Note, Interpreting the Constitution From Inside the Jury Box: Affecting Interstate
Commerce as an Element of the Crime, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615, 625 n.62 (1998). For example, in
California, “[t]here are four types of threats that would induce fear for purposes of the extortion statute:
(1) a threat of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the victim or to a third person; (2) a threat
to accuse the victim or any relative or family member of any crime; (3) a threat to expose or to impute to
the victim any deformity, disgrace, or crime; or (4) a threat to expose any secret affecting the victim or
his or her family.” RUTTER GROUP-CAL. CRIM. L. § 8:83 (2016–2017 ed.).
7. A car title loan is secured by the consumer’s paid-off vehicle, and it typically carries a triple-digit
interest rate and requires a single balloon payment due usually in 30 days or less. See Creola Johnson,
Creditors’ Use of Consumer Debt Criminalization Practices and Their Financial Abuse of Women, 34
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 47–49 (2016) (discussing criminalization tactics used against a single mother
who was forced to turn over possession of her car to the lender’s repossession agent and arguing that
such tactics were not only unlawful but constituted abuse).
8. See Westlake Services, LLC & Wilshire Consumer Credit, LLC 2015-CFPB-0026 (2015)
[hereinafter Westlake Consent Order] (consent order) (“‘Skip Tracy’ means a web-based, multimedia,
third-party paid service that allows users to place outgoing calls and choose (a) the phone number from
which the calls will appear to have originated; and (b) particular text that may appear on call recipients’
phones as Caller ID. If a call recipient returns a call to one of these phone numbers, Skip Tracy shows
the user the Caller ID text associated with the original outgoing call”). The lenders settled the case by
agreeing to pay $48.3 million, of which $44.1 million will be paid as restitution and loan reductions to
affected consumers. See CFPB Hits Auto Lender with $48.3M in Fines, Restitution, AM. BANKER (Oct.
2, 2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-hits-auto-lender-with-483m-in-finesrestitution [https://perma.cc/MD5F-NBME].
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extortion. Therefore, creditors should be criminally prosecuted for making
them.9
Part II transitions from describing creditors that only make threats to have
consumers arrested to describing creditors that employ the second form of
criminalization—filing police reports or complaints to get law enforcement to
charge consumers with crimes. Ms. McHan and Mr. Walker were victims of this
form of consumer debt criminalization.10 Although a creditor may claim it has the
right to file criminal charges, such a filing constitutes extortion when it accuses
the consumer of a crime in order to induce the consumer to either pay the debt
or relinquish ownership of assets.
Part III of this article describes how some creditors, instead of filing police
reports against consumers directly, misuse the civil contempt process as a back
door into the criminal justice system to have consumers arrested for failing to pay
civil debts. Chase Bank sued Ms. Uhlmeyer for defaulting on her credit card
payments to the company. After obtaining a default judgment against her, Chase
filed documents that required Ms. Uhlemeyer to appear for an oral hearing.11 Ms.
Uhlemeyer’s failure to appear was later used to obtain a civil contempt order,
which resulted in Ms. Uhlemeyer’s arrest.12 Part III describes the circumstances
under which a creditor’s request for an oral examination constitutes a pretext for
their ultimate goal of getting civil contempt orders and arrest warrants issued
against consumers. Such misuse of the civil contempt process is a criminalization
practice that constitutes extortion because the consumer is coerced into paying
to avoid arrest or to get out of jail.
Part IV then argues for the prosecution of creditors for extortion to deter
creditors from using criminalization practices to evade state constitutions that
prohibit the incarceration of individuals for unpaid civil debts. If left
unprosecuted, creditors will not only make a mockery of state constitutions, they
will also continue violating various consumer protection statutes that prohibit
threats of arrests against consumers for failure to pay civil debts. Because the
creditors described in this article have built their business models on issuing
extremely high-cost credit to cash-strapped consumers, their customers are, at
the outset, vulnerable to extortive threats. This vulnerability makes it more likely
that they will heed the creditors’ demands to pay—by borrowing from other
lenders, using protected income sources, or begging friends and relatives to pay
their debts. As a result, creditors should be prosecuted to protect these
vulnerable consumers from going further into debt and to protect indebted
consumers’ dependents and other loved ones.
9. In addition to being prosecuted on the basis that they threaten to accuse consumers of crime,
some creditors should be prosecuted on the grounds that they have subjected consumers to humiliation
and exposed their indebtedness to others by contacting their friends and relatives and by showing up at
their places of employment. See, e.g., Westlake Consent Order, supra note 8.
10. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
11. Serres & Howatt, supra note 1.
12. Id.
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Beyond prosecution, part V proposes solutions that include completely
banning payday lenders from filing criminal complaints, police reports, or taking
other action that causes a consumer to be accused of, or charged with, a crime
related to a payday loan debt. To address criminalization tactics employed by
RTO companies, state legislatures should amend any theft statutes related to
rental property to exclude consumers who obtained RTO property for personal,
family, or household use. To deter the misuse of civil contempt, states should
amend their civil procedure rules to prohibit a creditor from requesting an oral
examination in the absence of documented proof that the consumer is an abovemedian-income debtor. Otherwise, creditors will continue to use oral
examination requests as a pretext to achieving their real goal—a warrant for the
consumer’s arrest.
Proposed solutions also include allowing consumers to collect both treble and
punitive damages from creditors that have engaged in consumer criminalization
tactics. The occasional payment of a civil fine by some creditors appears to be
insufficient to deter them from employing consumer debt criminalization tactics.
When the cost of doing wrong outweighs the benefits gained from doing right,
then creditors will be deterred from using consumer criminalization tactics.
Lawmakers should, at a minimum, make unenforceable the creditors’ arbitration
clauses and class action waiver provisions. Otherwise, creditors will continue to
exploit the criminal justice system to terrorize consumers via threats of arrest
while simultaneously engaging in duplicitous tactics to lock those same
consumers out of the civil court system.
II
CRIMINALIZATION VIA LENDERS’ THREATS OF IMMINENT INCARCERATION
AND FILING OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS
The term “consumer debt criminalization” explains two common
criminalization tactics: creditors’ threating consumers with imminent arrest and
creditors’ filing criminal complaints that lead to consumers being formally
accused of crimes and sometimes arrested.13 This part provides new examples of
these criminalization tactics and asserts that they constitute extortion. When
criminalization practices only take the form of threats to have the consumer
arrested, such threats may seem trivial. However, nothing can be further from
the truth. Numerous federal and state enforcement actions demonstrate that
consumers regularly succumb to these threats by paying phantom debts, that is,
debts not actually owed, or by paying amounts far in excess of what is owed.14
13. I first used the term “consumer debt criminalization practices” in a law review article to describe
the pervasive use of such practices against women and their disparate impact on them. See Johnson, supra
note 7, at 47–50.
14. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Federal, State and Local Law
Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown against Abusive Debt Collectors (Nov. 4,
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/11/ftc-federal-state-local-law-enforcement-
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The lenders’ threats to have consumers arrested and charged with a crime are
made to intimidate consumers into complying with the lenders’ demands by
making payments or turning over personal property like cars or furniture.15
When criminalization practices take the form of a lender actually filing a
police report or obtaining a warrant for the consumer’s arrest, such actions are
taken by the lender to coerce consumers into immediately complying with the
lender’s demands.16 A consumer who may not have been moved by a verbal
threat will then be confronted with the real possibility of going to jail because of
the lender’s actions. Under those circumstances, consumers try, and often find a
way, to pay to avoid going to or to get out of jail.
These criminalization practices constitute extortion because the creditors’
threats and conduct engender fear in consumers that results in consumers losing
control of their bank accounts, relinquishing ownership of their vehicles, losing
possession of their rent-to-own merchandise, and, sometimes, losing their
freedom (at least temporarily).17
partners-announce [https://perma.cc/2D4F-LKBB] (announcing the results of Operation Collection
Protection, a nationwide initiative by the FTC, in collaboration with 71 enforcement partners, which as
of that date, had led to the filing of 115 cases and the shutting down of several companies, including
companies that used threats to coerce consumers into making payments on phantom payday loan debts
(in other words, debts not owed) or making payments to companies lacking the authority to collect such
debts). See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Action: Debt Collector Banned from Collection
Business (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/08/ftc-action-debtcollector-banned-collection-business [https://perma.cc/73R7-67JN] (summarizing the settlement of a case
filed by the FTC and New York’s Attorney General against four debt collection companies “charg[ing]
them with collecting on fake payday loans they knew consumers did not really owe, and using deceptive
and abusive tactics to get them to pay, including false threats of lawsuits and arrest”); Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Florida Residents Sentenced for Defrauding and Threatening Spanish-Speaking
Consumers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-residents-sentenced-defrauding-andthreatening-spanish-speaking-consumers [https://perma.cc/PYR3-EK4H] (summarizing the conviction
of two individuals operating a scam that defrauded Spanish-speaking consumers using numerous threats,
including threats of arrest and deportation); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Takes Action to
Stop Phantom Debt Scam that Targeted Spanish-Speaking Consumers Nationwide (Oct. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-takes-action-stop-phantom-debt-scam-target
ed-spanish-speaking [https://perma.cc/2VQH-6L6J] (summarizing a temporary restraining order
imposed on debt collectors targeting Spanish-speaking persons who collected over $2 million of nonexistent debt, or “phantom debt,” by continually calling and harassing the victims and sometimes abusing
them with profane language). See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumer
finance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Fair-Debt-Collection-Practices-Act-Annual-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LA2M-AG4S] (summarizing numerous cases filed in 2016 separately by the CFPB and the FTC
against companies and individuals accused of violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, stating
that debt collection companies and their attempts to collect phantom debts comprise the majority of
complaints submitted by consumers to the CFPB’s Consumer Response program, and announcing that
in cases filed by the CFPB consumers received $39 million in restitution).
15. See, e.g., infra notes 20–40 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., infra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 42–69 and accompanying text (analyzing extortion law and asserting that
creditors commit criminal extortion when they make threats to have consumers arrested for unpaid civil
debts or threats to expose their debts to others); infra notes 82–112 and accompanying text (explaining
how creditors commit extortion when they file police reports and take similar actions to have consumers
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A. Creditors Threats Of Arrest Often Successfully Coerce Consumers Into
Paying Or Turning Over Assets
Some lenders only make threats to have a consumer arrested, and they do so
by conjuring in the consumer’s mind illusions of an imminent arrest. Sometimes
the threat is based on an actual criminal statute that seems to match the
consumer’s conduct.18 Other times, creditors accuse consumers of crimes that do
not apply to the consumers’ conduct, relying on opaque criminal statutes that
consumers do not understand.19 Virginia Robinson, a resident of West Virginia,
provides a glaring example of a consumer who fell prey to criminal accusations
after defaulting on a car title loan from Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (FAL).20
Under a car title loan, a vehicle that the consumer owns outright is used as
collateral to secure a personal loan equal to only a fraction of vehicle’s value.21
To get the loan, the consumer generally must bring the vehicle to the lender and
surrender a clean certificate of title, which is proof that the consumer owns the
vehicle and no other lender has a lien or claim against the vehicle.22 Car title loans
are legal in many states, even though they carry triple-digit interest rates and
could lead to the loss of a consumer’s vehicle—often the only reliable

arrested for failing to pay debts or to relinquish possession of their assets).
18. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 20–28 (describing how companies accuse consumers of committing
crimes, such as passing a bad check to get a payday loan, and then successfully create the illusion of
imminent incarceration to coerce consumers into paying phantom payday loan debts or paying amounts
far greater than owed).
19. See, e.g., infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text (explaining how a car title lender used an
opaquely worded criminal statute to accuse Virginia Robinson of a crime for failing to immediately allow
the lender to repossess her vehicle).
20. Trial Pleading at 60, West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Fast Auto Loans Inc., No. 3:12-cv-64, 2012
WL 4864760 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) [hereinafter WV’s Complaint] (Exh. J. - Affidavit of Virginia Robinson).
21. AMANDA QUESTER & JEAN ANN FOX, CAR TITLE LENDING: DRIVING BORROWERS TO
FINANCIAL RUIN 4 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/researchpublication/rr008-Car_Title_Lending-0405.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SPG-59ZQ] (stating that car title loans
are sometimes referred to as auto title loans, car title pawns, title pledge loans, or other similar names,
and are marketed to cash-strapped, credit-challenged consumers).
22. See, e.g., In re Schwalb, 347 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (stating that the debtor provided
two clean certificates of title to obtain loans secured by two vehicles, holding that the car title lender
violated several provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and imposing on the lender
minimum statutory damages of nearly $26,000 for its violations) (applying Nevada law). See generally Jim
Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535,
542 (2012) (describing the steps to obtain a car title loan and stating that borrowers usually have to
produce clear title).
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transportation.23 West Virginia, however, is one of a few states that judicially
banned car title loans.24
Because of West Virginia’s ban, Ms. Robinson had to cross the border to
Virginia to obtain a $1,000 loan secured by her 1999 Jeep Cherokee.25 Ms.
Robinson stated in an affidavit that after she defaulted on her loan payments,
FAL’s employees repeatedly called her daughter, friends, and co-workers and
left messages that FAL would take her Jeep if she failed to pay the car title loan.26
On the occasions when Ms. Robinson was able to speak by telephone with a FAL
employee, the employee would threaten to send a repossession agent, known as
a “repo man,” along with a sheriff’s deputy to pick up the Jeep.27
FAL eventually sent a repo man to Ms. Robinson’s home. Because she was
not home, the repo man left a written document with her daughter captioned
“CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.”28 The document contained several bold faced,
all capitalized paragraphs, one of which ended with the following crime she
supposedly committed: “A 3RD DEGREE FELONY CONVERSION OF
COLLATERALIZED PROPERTY.”29
The document given to Ms. Robinson also cited to and quoted from a Virginia
statute describing larceny as the fraudulent conversion or removal of property
subject to a lien.30 A person is guilty of larceny under this statute if, among other
things, he or she conceals the location of property that is subject to a lien.31
Another provision of the Virginia code makes it a larceny to “fraudulently sell,
pledge, pawn or remove such property from the premises where it has been
agreed that it shall remain, and refuse to disclose the location thereof.”32 This
23. See Delvin Davis, Press Release, Consumers Lose $8 Billion In Fees Each Year With Payday
And Car-title Loans, Center for Responsible Lending (May 17, 2016), http://www.responsible
lending.org/media/consumers-lose-8-billion-fees-each-year-payday-and-car-title-loans [https://perma.cc/
56VK-3T72] (stating that car title lending is legal in 23 states). See, e.g., Gregoria v. Total Asset
Recovery, Inc., No. 12-4315, 2015 WL 115501 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2015) (holding that a repossession agent
for a car title lender could be found liable under RICO for repossessing a car after the consumer’s default
on a loan with a 150% interest rate, which was usurious under Pennsylvania law).
24. Car title lending is illegal in West Virginia by judicial decision. See State ex rel. McGraw v. Pawn
America, 518 S.E.2d 859, 861 (W. Va. 1998).
25. WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 1.
26. Id. at 1–2.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3 (identifying the repo man as an employee from K.A.R. Towing, a repo company located
in Harrisburg, Virginia) (emphasis in certificate).
29. Id. (emphasis in certificate).
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id.
32. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-115. The statute provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person is in possession of any personal property, including motor vehicles or farm
products, in any capacity, the title or ownership of which he has agreed in writing shall be or
remain in another, or on which he has given a lien, and such person so in possession shall
fraudulently sell, pledge, pawn or remove such property from the premises where it has been
agreed that it shall remain, and refuse to disclose the location thereof, or otherwise dispose of
the property or fraudulently remove the same from the Commonwealth [of Virginia], without
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statute became law in 1975, decades before the high-cost lenders like FAL began
issuing car title loans.33 No evidence on the record shows that Ms. Robinson
intended to sell, destroy, or dispose of her own car. Furthermore, she must have
had FAL’s permission, at least implicitly, to move her vehicle outside Virginia
because FAL knew she lived and worked in West Virginia, a state in which car
title lending is not legal.34 Ms. Robinson did not sell or get rid of her car; she
simply could not afford the payments on the car title loan. Therefore, she could
not have been guilty of larceny. However, if Ms. Robinson and other borrowers
threatened with arrest read only the Certificate of Service or looked online for
the cited larceny statute, they could have erroneously concluded that they had
committed a crime and could only avoid prosecution by turning over their
vehicles to FAL or by paying the entire debt owed.
Research has not uncovered any cases or news reports indicating that a
consumer who has defaulted on a car title loan can be prosecuted under this
Virginia criminal statute. Therefore, FAL had no basis to believe such a
prosecution was possible, and it never intended to seek the prosecution of Ms.
Robinson. This conclusion is supported by a lawsuit filed by Darrell McGraw,
former Attorney General for West Virginia, against FAL, its parent company,
and their officers (hereinafter the “FAL defendants”).35 According to the lawsuit,
the FAL defendants repeatedly violated the state’s consumer protection law by,
among other things, threatening to accuse consumers of crimes and have them
arrested.36 The motive for such threats was to coerce consumers into making
payments or turning over their vehicles.37 By conjuring up this larceny crime and
by repeatedly harassing the customers who had defaulted, FAL was able to do
exactly what it wanted—take cars belonging to Ms. Robinson38 and others and
the written consent of the owner or lienor or the person in whom the title is, or, if such writing
be a deed of trust, without the written consent of the trustee or beneficiary in such deed of trust,
he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. See id.
34. See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶16–17 (alleging that the majority of West Virginia
residents who obtained a car title loan from the FAL defendants had to cross the state border into
Virginia and identifying 512 certificate of titles with notations of liens filed by the FAL defendants in the
state of West Virginia, not Virginia).
35. Id.
36. See Second Amended Complaint, State v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc., 2013 WL 8539987 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct.) (No. 12C231) [hereinafter WV’s Second Amended Complaint].
37. See id. at ¶¶ 64–65 (alleging that the defendants also “wrongfully enlist[ed] uniformed police
officers to carry out vehicle seizures without a court order”).
38. WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 1. After the repo man left the Certificate of Service,
another repo man, acting on FAL’s behalf, appeared at Ms. Robinson’s place of employment to try to
get her to turn over her vehicle. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Ms. Robinson stated that she continued to get
telephone calls at least every other day from FAL’s employees. Id. She finally decided to surrender the
vehicle to FAL, which subsequently sold it. Id. Although she made several payments on the $1,000 loan,
Ms. Robinson stated that FAL never gave her an accounting of the sale proceeds and never gave her
surplus funds in excess of the debt owed, as required under secured transactions law. Id. See also West
Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (N.D.W. Va. 2013)
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sell them, allegedly in violation of the state’s consumer protection law.39 The
West Virginia Attorney General’s investigation revealed that the FAL
defendants had repossessed at least 218 vehicles owned by West Virginia
residents.40
Given the flagrant practices of the FAL defendants and other lenders, several
states have sued some of them for numerous violations, including making
unlawful threats against consumers.41 As explained in part II.B, law enforcement
and prosecutors need to recognize that these same threats amount to extortion
and lenders should be prosecuted for making them.

(summarizing West Virginia’s allegations, including an allegation that FAL failed to comply with state
law by failing to provide written notices accounting for the sale of repossessed vehicles and by failing to
refund surplus proceeds when consumers were entitled to receive them).
39. See WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 64–65 (alleging that the FAL
defendants made direct threats to consumers to have them prosecuted and used police officers to help
coerce consumers into relinquishing ownership of their vehicles). See also Fast Auto Loans, 918 F. Supp.
2d at 563–65 (granting West Virginia’s motion to remand its lawsuit against the FAL defendants back to
state court).
40. See Chris Dickerson, AG’s Office Reaches $1.2M Settlement in Auto Title Lender Case, W. VA.
RECORD (Apr. 9, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20170426132902/http://wvrecord.com/stories/
510586931-ag-s-office-reaches-1-2m-settlement-in-auto-title-lender-case (Under the settlement, the
companies agreed to close all accounts, cancel all debt owed to them by West Virginia consumers
(estimated at $816,000), return any unsold vehicles seized from state residents, and remove any liens on
those vehicles). The FAL defendants eventually settled the case filed against them by agreeing to pay
$1.2 million but not admitting to any wrongdoing. Id. Whatever compensation Ms. Robinson and others
were able to obtain from the settlement; it would not be enough to restore the loss of valuable vehicles
that the lenders re-sold to others.
41. See, e.g., id. In addition to the state of West Virginia, other state and federal authorities have
filed enforcement actions against RTO companies, payday lenders, and car title lenders for violating
applicable laws by, among other things, engaging in unlawful debt collection practices. See, e.g., Appendix
D, Rent-A-Center West, Inc v. Washington, No. 08-2-32502-4 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2010) (In
defense of a 2009 lawsuit filed by Rent-A-Center against the State of Washington and its then Attorney
General James Sugarman, the state obtained written sworn statements from customers who described
under penalty of perjury practices by Rent-A-Center’s employees that amount to unlawful and abusive
collection tactics, including making threats to have customers arrested); Consent Decree, Rent-A-Center
West, Inc. v. Washington, No. 08-2-32502-4 SEA, 2010 WL 2572150 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2010)
(lacking an admission of wrongdoing, Rent-A-Center entered into a consent decree with Washington
and agreed to pay a fine); Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against ACE
Case Express for Pushing Payday Borrowers Into a Cycle of Debt (July 10, 2014), http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-payd
ay-borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt [https://perma.cc/HA6K-E7LX] (In a lawsuit filed by the CFPB against
ACE Cash Express, the second largest payday lender, the CFPB alleged that ACE’s own in-house
employees as well as ACE’s third-party debt collectors threatened consumers with criminal prosecution
and uncovered an ACE training manual with a graphic image allegedly demonstrating how ACE
employees were expected to create a “sense of urgency” in order to get consumers to pay); Press Release,
Mich. Att’y Gen. Bill Schuette, Schuette Secures Victory Against Auto Title Loan Company Liquidation,
LLC to Protect Michigan Residents from Illegal Title Loans (June 8, 2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170424204834 /http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849-386461--,0
0.html (announcing that Michigan’s attorney general obtained a default judgment and permanent
injunction against Liquidation, LLC, along with several related defendants, for numerous violations,
including making illegal car title loans and engaging in unlawful collection practices, such as illegally
repossessing consumers’ vehicles and stealing the equity after selling the vehicles).
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B. Creditors’ Threats Constitute Extortion Because They Accuse The
Consumer Of Committing Crimes And They Expose The Consumer’s
Indebtedness
Extortion is the making of a threat to incite fear in another person to induce
that person to hand over money or other property.42 Each state’s statute identifies
several types of threats that form the basis for an extortion or coercion
prosecution.43 Among the list of unlawful threats is threatening to accuse a person
of committing a crime to induce fear in that person in order to extract money or
other property.44
A close analysis of the investigation conducted by West Virginia’s Attorney
General against the FAL defendants provide examples of extortion and how they
could have prosecuted them for using threats to coerce Ms. Robinson and others
into relinquishing ownership of their vehicles. First, consider the following
language in the Certificate of Service given to Ms. Robinson:
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS NOTICE IS UNLAWFUL UNDER THE
PROVISION OF VIRGINIA CODE (SECTION 18 PARAGRAPH 2,
SUBPARAGRAPH 115/118) IF UNDER A LEIN, AND IS A 3RD DEGREE
FELONY CONVERSION OF COLLATERIALIZED PROPERTY.
SHOULD YOU FAIL TO CONTACT K.A.R. TOWING IMMEDIATELY AT (540)
564-0131, YOUR INACTION WILL GIVE LITTLE CHOICE AND MAY RESULT
IN A COMPLAINT BEING FILED WITH YOURLOCAL MAGISTRATE. THIS
MAY RESULT IN A FELONY WARRANT BEING ISSUED FOR YOUR
ARREST.45

The second page of the document begins with the following question: “Is it
against the law to hide your car from being repossessed?”46 It provided the
following short answer: “In Virginia = yes.”
Under Virginia and West Virginia law,47 the words contained in the
Certificate of Service constitute extortion because they threaten to accuse Ms.
Robinson of a crime. Examine the above words in light of a relevant case in which
the court construed the defendant’s writing as an implied threat to accuse
42. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL Law § 20.4 (2d. ed. 2003 & 2016 Update).
43. Id.; RUTTER GROUP-CAL. CRIM. L., supra note 6, at § 8:83 (describing four unlawful threats
under California law).
44. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 42. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL L. § 135.60(4) (2008) (“A person is guilty of
coercion in the second degree when he or she compels or induces . . . by means of instilling in him or her
a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will . . . [a]ccuse some person of a
crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him or her”).
45. WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 3 (emphasis in certificate).
46. Id. at 3–4.
47. In Virginia, “[a]ny person who (i) threatens injury to the character, person, or property of
another person, (ii) accuses him of any offense, . . . and thereby extorts money, property, or pecuniary
benefit or any note, bond, or other evidence of debt from him or any other person, is guilty of a Class 5
felony.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (2016). In West Virginia, “[i]f any person threaten injury to the
character, person or property of another person, or to the character, person or property of his wife or
child, or to accuse him or them of any offense, and thereby extort money, pecuniary benefit, or any bond,
note or other evidence of debt, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in
the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years.” W. VA. CODE § 61-2-13 (2016).
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someone of a crime, resulting in an extortion conviction. In People v. Umana,48
co-defendants Jessica Langshaw and Raul Umana devised a scheme whereby
Langshaw, after finding men in an internet chat room and meeting them in
person, would have sex with them and then later accuse them of rape.49 Both
defendants were convicted of several counts of attempted extortion.50 On appeal,
Langshaw challenged her convictions involving one victim, Jared P., a man that
Langshaw met when she was only seventeen years old. 51 Langshaw argued that
her conviction involving him should be overturned because he had committed a
crime (statutory rape) given that he knew that she was under-age when the two
had sex.52 She argued that her letter to him was an attempt to settle a potential
civil claim against him, not to accuse him of a crime.53 The appellate court focused
on the following relevant language in her letter to Jared:
I would like to settle this matter in confidence, but I’m prepared to take further action
if you wish to dispute my claim. As you know, I’ve notified the Sacramento Police
Department and State District Attorney. I have also made arrangements with an
attorney to bring civil charges against you if you refuse to meet the above demands.54

The court noted that Langshaw stated that she was “prepared to take further
action” but did not specify what action, and made reference to bringing “civil
charges.”55 According to the court, those words and the letter as a whole
contained an implied threat to continue accusing him of a crime and seeking
prosecution if he did not meet her demands.56
The court further stated this inference was supported by her actions.57 She
had already spoken to the district attorney about bringing charges against the
victim and was still in contact with the police at the time she wrote the letter.58
Thus, Langshaw made an implicit threat to continuing accusing him of a crime.59
The case for an extortion conviction against the FAL defendants would be
even stronger than the case against Langshaw. The Certificate of Service
constitutes an explicit threat given that it never uses “settle,” “settlement,” or
similar words. Additionally, it cites to and quotes the entire larceny statute it
accuses Ms. Robinson of violating. By using the caption “Certificate of Service,”
the writing also creates the impression that some type of legal action against Ms.
Robinson may have already begun. Moreover, it uses the words “warrant” and
48. People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
49. Id. at 628–29.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 640–42.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 638.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 640 (“Parties guilty of the offense here alleged seldom possess the hardihood to speak out
boldly and plainly, but deal in mysterious and ambiguous phrases.”).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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“arrest.”60 Therefore, a jury could easily conclude that the FAL defendants
committed extortion by explicitly threatening to accuse Ms. Robinson of
committing a crime.61
In addition to this written communication, the conduct of the defendants and
their repo agents threatened to injure, and did in fact injure, Ms. Robinson’s
character. In most states, threatening to expose someone else’s secrets to subject
them to humiliation or harm their character to extract property constitutes an
unlawful threat supporting an extortion conviction. A Virginia case, Stein v.
Commonwealth, provides an illustration.62 There, the defendant felt that his wife
had been wrongfully terminated and, as a result, sent letters to the supervisor
threatening to expose the fact that she had previously been involved in a
sadomasochistic sexual relationship.63 Because the defendant’s written
communications included words such as “settlement” and “terms,” he argued
that his actions were mere attempts to reach a settlement so that his wife could
receive an apology and have her employment records protected.64 The Stein court
disagreed, reasoning that no settlement—in the sense of each party giving up
something to resolve an employment dispute—had been proposed. Instead, the
defendant only proposed to abstain from exposing the supervisor’s previous
sadomasochistic relationship.65 His words conveyed a threat to injure the
supervisor’s character and, as a result, were sufficient to sustain his extortion
conviction.
Like the defendant in Stein, the FAL defendants threatened to expose Ms.
Robinson’s indebtedness to others and followed through on those threats when
they contacted her friends, relatives, and co-workers.66 According to Ms.
Robinson, the FAL defendants not only told others about Ms. Robinson’s loan
default but also about their intention to repossess her vehicle.67 Moreover, one of
FAL’s repo men actually came to Ms. Robinson’s place of employment, asked
her co-worker to identify Ms. Robinson, and discussed with the co-worker the

60. See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 3 (It plainly states: “THIS MAY RESULT IN A
FELONY WARRANT BEING ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST.”) (emphasis in original).
61. The testimony of Ms. Robinson and other consumers who borrowed from FAL would show the
company engaged in a pattern of making threats. See WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36,
at ¶ 62 (The FAL defendants “shamed or coerced consumers to make payments and to relinquish
possession of vehicles by accusing them of fraud, crimes and other conduct that, if true, would tend to
disgrace them or subject them to ridicule or contempt of society, in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2124(b) and W. Va. Code § 46A-6-104.”).
62. Stein v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Id. (Prior to the wife’s termination, the wife and the supervisor had been friends and the
supervisor had revealed her involvement in a previous sadomasochistic relationship.).
64. Id. at 242.
65. Id. at 241 (stating that extortion is using “wrongful methods” or acting in “an unlawful manner:
in order “to compel payments by means of threats of injury to person, property, or reputation”) (quoting
Extort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
66. See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 2–3.
67. Id. at 1–2.
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location of Ms. Robinson’s vehicle.68 All of this was done to injure Ms.
Robinson’s character by exposing her financial troubles to others for the purpose
of getting her to turn over the vehicle. According to the West Virginia Attorney
General’s lawsuit and the sworn declarations submitted by consumers, the FAL
defendants violated state law by regularly engaging in a pattern of exposing
consumers’ indebtedness to others.69 This amounts to extortion.
C. Some Creditors Move From Making Threats To Actually Filing Police
Reports To Have Consumers Arrested
Though the FAL defendants only made threats, some creditors go a step
further and actually file criminal complaints or police reports to extort money or
property from consumers. Janellen Edwards’ experience is instructive because it
demonstrates that even when a creditor knows that a consumer has not
committed a crime, it nevertheless has the ability to initiate an arrest in order to
intimidate the consumer into paying or turning over property.70
Ms. Edwards signed an RTO contract to buy three pieces of furniture from
TRS Home Furnishings (TRS) and, thereafter, made a few payments.71 Due to a
family crisis, she was unable to pay under the agreed schedule.72 She asked for
and received from TRS a revised payment schedule.73 After Ms. Edwards made
the first payment under the new schedule, TRS employees demanded full
payment of the entire outstanding balance.74 TRS’s intimidating behavior
included making daily calls demanding that Ms. Edwards pay, leaving voicemail
messages threatening to show up at her house to repossess the furniture, exposing

68. Id.
69. WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶ 59 (“The Defendants routinely,
systematically, and repeatedly contact consumer’s employers, co-workers, references, family members,
friends, and other third parties to leave messages for the consumer to contact them when, in fact, the
Defendants have current location information for the consumers and when the true purpose of the call
is to annoy, abuse, harass, embarrass or humiliate the consumer, and to disclose the fact that the
consumer owes a delinquent debt directly or indirectly, in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-126(b) and
W. Va. Code § 46A-6-104.”).
70. Because Ms. Edwards endured several weeks of escalating threats from the RTO company until
she was eventually arrested, her story is very lengthy. Rather than provide upfront the entire narrative
of her ordeal, the discussion will begin with a brief summary and then highlight the parts of Ms. Edwards’
ordeal that are relevant to each count of extortion the RTO company could have been charged with
committing. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 1,
Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 5497167 (Or. Cir. July 19, 2010).
71. Amended Complaint at ¶ 2, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL
5497172 (Or. Cir. Feb. 9, 2010) (stating that TRS was an assumed business name for The Rental Store,
Inc.). Ms. Edwards purchased furniture from TRS in hopes of improving her credit. See Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 2 (stating that a
“financial counselor suggested that she [Edwards] make a large purchase on credit, which would in turn
improve the rest of her credit”).
72. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 5 (Ms.
Edwards’ father was diagnosed with cancer.).
73. Id. at ¶ 8.
74. Id. at ¶ 9.
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her indebtedness to relatives and friends, and appearing more than once at her
home and job to force her to turn over the furniture.75
When none of these threats achieved the desired results, a TRS employee
filed a complaint with the local police department.76 Thereafter, two police
officers arrived at Ms. Edwards’ workplace to issue a criminal citation and inform
her of the required court appearance.77 She was later arrested. According to Ms.
Edwards, the prosecutor tried to get her to plead guilty, but she refused.78 She
did, however, return all of the furniture to TRS and pay the entire debt. Ms.
Edwards hired an attorney, who succeeded in getting the criminal case against
her dismissed.79 Before the case was dismissed, Ms. Edwards had to appear in
court several times to respond to the charges initiated by TRS.80
Ms. Edwards eventually filed a civil lawsuit against TRS and, after a jury trial,
won a verdict on three claims, including malicious prosecution and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.81 Her success on these claims supports the
assertion that TRS committed extortion.
D. Creditors Commit Extortion When They Know The Consumer Has Not
Committed a Crime But Nevertheless File Police Reports
Based on the above conduct, TRS committed extortion by threatening to (and
actually) exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness to others and by threatening to
(and actually) accusing her of a crime in order to force her to pay and turnover
her furniture.
Evidence produced by Ms. Edwards at trial shows TRS violated Oregon’s
Uniform Debt Collection Practices Act by exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness
to others to coerce full payment from her.82 The Oregon act prohibits numerous
collection practices, including “[c]ommunicat[ing] or threat[ing] to communicate
with a debtor’s employer concerning the nature or existence of the debt.”83 A
TRS employee not only showed up at Ms. Edwards’ job, but TRS employees also
left several voicemail messages on a telephone line where her co-workers and
supervisor heard that she owed TRS money.84 As a result, Ms. Edwards was
75. Id. at ¶¶ 10–13.
76. Id. at ¶ 18
77. Amended Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 14.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. General Judgment at 2, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 5497172
(Or. Cir. Feb. 9, 2010). Ms. Edwards also won on her claim that TRS violated several provisions of the
state’s debt collection law. Id.
82. For a further explanation of the Oregon Uniform Debt Collection Practices Act, see Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at 6. See also OR. REV.
STAT. § 646.639 (2015).
83. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.639(2)(f).
84. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial at 12, Edwards
v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 8593165 (Or. Cir. Oct. 6, 2010).
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extremely embarrassed and did not want to go to work.85 The only question now
is what did TRS’s employees intend by such actions. The purpose of the voicemail
messages about Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness was to cause her to become
embarrassed to such a degree that she would be coerced into either paying in full
or turning over the furniture.86 Oregon case law has already recognized this
unlawful collection method—revealing debts to the consumer’s employer—as
prohibited precisely because it is an “abusive method[] [used] to pressure debtors
to pay.”87 Accordingly, TRS’s conduct amounted to extortion.
In addition to committing extortion by exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness,
TRS committed extortion by threatening to accuse her of a crime. As with the
threats discussed in part II.B., these threats must be addressed because TRS and
other RTO dealers will argue that the very existence of property-related theft
crimes gives RTO dealers the right to file police reports and, thereby, protects
them from prosecution for extortion.
Ms. Edwards’ civil complaint against TRS failed to identify the specific crime
TRS accused her of committing. However, she was most likely charged with
criminal possession of rented or leased personal property, a felony in Oregon’s
criminal code.88 The RTO industry has lobbied for the passage of laws
criminalizing a consumer’s failure to pay for RTO property or failure to
relinquish possession of RTO property.89 As a previous article explained in detail,
consumers who obtain RTO merchandise are unlawfully being charged with
crimes when they can no longer make the required payments.90 As one court has
articulated, such a crime is a specific intent crime.91 Thus, simply showing that a
consumer has failed to return RTO property does not meet the mens rea
requirement.92 Moreover, based on the outcome of Ms. Edwards’ lawsuit against
85. Id.
86. Id. at 12–13.
87. See Porter v. Hill, 838 P.2d 45, 49 (Or. 1992).
88. See OR. REV. STAT. § 164.140(1)(a).
89. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 57–58 (describing how RTO dealers in Florida lobbied state
lawmakers to amend a criminal statute to make it easier to convict a consumer of a crime based on the
consumer’s failure to turn over possession of RTO property).
90. See id.
91. See State v. Sanders, 905 So. 2d 241, 242–43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Altenbernd, C.J.,
concurring).
92. See id. Chief Judge Altenbernd further explained why intent to commit the theft crime could
not be based on the fact that Ms. Sanders failed to return the RTO property after the company sent a
demand letter:
Maybe Ms. Sanders’ husband or boyfriend ran off with the furniture, and she cannot return it.
Maybe her house burned down, and the furniture was destroyed. Maybe the landlord evicted
her and kept the furniture. Maybe the furniture was destroyed in a hurricane. The point is that
under the law established . . . mere proof that the certified letter was returned undeliverable
would not actually be sufficient to establish . . . the intent for this crime of theft. Being poor and
unable to pay your debts is still not a crime in Florida.
Id. at 243 (emphasis added). See also Bert v. Commonwealth, No. 1499–10–1, 2011 WL 4916203, at *3
(Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011) (A Virginia court reversed the appellant’s conviction for failing to return an
RTO television and held that “[a]lthough the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to prove that
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TRS, the company knew she had tried to make payments but refused to accept
any more partial payments.93 The jury, therefore, found TRS liable for malicious
prosecution because it initiated criminal proceedings against her without
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.94 Without probable cause
to believe a crime had been committed, TRS’s motive in threatening to accuse
her of a crime and eventually filing a police report against her was to coerce her
into complying with its demands. That is extortion.
Although TRS and other RTO dealers will argue they reasonably believe a
crime is afoot when a customer fails to return RTO merchandise, courts and
juries can readily peel back the thin veil of this argument by looking to the true
purpose for calling the police. An analogous case, Lashley v. Bowman,95 is
instructive on this point. There, a restaurant owner called the police after a
patron, Ms. Lashley, refused to pay for lobster that she found inedible due to it
being partially frozen.96 When the police officer arrived and heard the owner’s
version of events, the police officer told Ms. Lashley that she had to pay for the
food or she would be taken to jail.97 After the owner signed an affidavit stating
that he wanted Ms. Lashley arrested for defrauding an innkeeper, the officer
handcuffed Ms. Lashley on the spot and led her out of the restaurant into a squad
car.98 Ms. Lashley fought the criminal charge, which was eventually dropped, and
then sued the owner for malicious prosecution.99
The court denied the owner’s motion to dismiss after determining that a jury
could find that the owner lacked probable cause to believe Ms. Lashley had
committed fraud on an innkeeper.100 Instead, “the true purpose and intent behind
the [owner’s] calling the police was to attempt to coerce and intimidate this
patron into paying money.”101 The owner admitted that he never tested or looked
at the lobster to determine whether it was frozen or inedible.102 The owner also
admitted that he assumed that Ms. Lashley would simply “pay up” and admitted

appellant breached her written lease agreement with Crusader [the RTO company], the evidence failed,
as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to defraud Crusader by
failing to abide by the terms of the lease agreement.”).
93. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 17
(quoting and citing a TRS employee’s sworn declaration regarding the payment schedule Ms. Edwards
was required to follow).
94. To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, a
showing that the defendant did not have probable cause to believe the plaintiff had committed a crime.
See STUART M. SPEISER, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:4 (2017 Update).
95. Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 407–08.
99. Id. at 407, 409.
100. Id. at 408.
101. Id.
102. Id at 407.
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that “it’s never gone that far before, because when the police come, they always
pay up and leave.”103
Just like the restaurant owner in Lashley, TRS’s employees clearly used
police officers to attempt to coerce Ms. Edwards into paying money or giving up
the furniture.104 Her saved recordings of the voicemail messages left by the TRS
employees demonstrate that they initially made several threats to have her
arrested in order to get Ms. Edwards to comply.105 Also, the evidence at trial
showed that the officers’ decision to arrest Ms. Edwards was based on employees’
statements falsely representing Ms. Edwards as refusing to make further
payments.106
The previously discussed Umana case is once again relevant because it dispels
any notion that a defendant can avoid an extortion conviction by arguing that he
or she believed a crime had been committed.107 In that case, that defendant
Langshaw claimed that she believed Jared had had raped her when she was a
minor.108 Therefore, she had a right to go the police department about this
possible crime. The court held that, while Langshaw may have had the right to
pursue statutory rape charges against Jared, she did not have the right to use the
threat of criminal process as a means of collecting money on a potential civil claim
against him.109 “The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a
means of collecting a debt. To invoke such process for the purpose named is, as
held by all authorities, contrary to public policy.”110
Like Langshaw in Umana, TRS’s employees repeatedly threatened to have
Ms. Edwards charged with a crime in order to collect on a civil debt, not because
they thought she had committed a crime.111 If TRS’s employees had simply filed
103. Id.
104. See Amended Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 5.
105. Id. at ¶¶ 5–10. For example, an employee, who identified himself by name as the credit manager
at TRS, left the following voicemail message: “I will get the authorities involved in this unless you call
me and return my merchandise.” See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment,
supra note 70, at 3. The employee further threatened: “I promise you, Janelle, I will be at the courthouse,
at the DA’s office. I will file charges against you. And if that stuff is in your mom’s house, I will file
charges on her for receiving stolen merchandise.” Id.
106. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial, supra note
84, at 2–3 (quoting the deposition testimony of the arresting officers, who indicated that the TRS
employees failed to produce several letters written by Ms. Edwards where she asked TRS to accept her
payment). TRS’s employees falsely accused Ms. Edwards of selling the furniture to her mother and left
voicemail messages threatening to have the mother arrested for receiving stolen merchandise. Id. Their
threats to falsely accuse Ms. Edwards and her mother of crimes constituted extortion under Oregon law.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1)(e) (making it a crime to compel or induce another person to engage in
conduct from which the person has the legal right to abstain by causing the person to fear being falsely
accused of committing a crime or causing criminal charges to be filed against the person).
107. See People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625, 640–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
108. See id. at 628–29.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 640–41 (emphasis added).
111. See generally General Judgment, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL
5412242 (Or. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010).
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a police report and had not made any threats, extortion could not be established.
But that is not what happened. TRS’s filing of a police report came several weeks
after TRS’s employees had made repeated threats to have Ms. Edwards arrested
and threats to send the police to her place of employment.112 This conduct
amounts to extortion.
III
CRIMINALIZATION VIA CREDITORS’ ABUSE OF CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCESS
Rather than threatening and initiating criminal prosecution of consumers,
some creditors engage in consumer debt criminalization by misusing the civil
court system as a backdoor into the criminal justice system.113 Though civil
contempt is technically a legitimate tool to use against debtors who fail to comply
with court orders, payday lenders and other creditors misuse civil contempt when
they have reason to believe that an oral examination is not likely to lead to the
discovery of non-exempt assets that can be sold to pay civil debts. As
demonstrated by the story of Wakita Shaw, this misuse induces in consumers a
fear of being arrested for committing a crime, thereby coercing them into paying
debts.
A. One Consumer’s Trip To Jail For Civil Contempt
Ms. Shaw’s road trip to jail started out innocently when she obtained a payday
loan from Sunshine Title and Check Loan Company in St. Louis, Missouri.114
After Ms. Shaw failed to repay a $425 loan, the payday lender obtained a default
judgment against her and then filed the necessary documents that required Ms.
Shaw to appear in court for an oral hearing.115 When she failed to appear, the
lender then filed a civil contempt motion and eventually convinced a local judge
to issue a body attachment order.116 This constituted a warrant for her arrest for
failing to appear.117 Ms. Shaw was subsequently arrested.118 By then, the payday
loan debt, including penalties and interest, had grown to $855, but she was then
obligated to post bail of $1,250 to get out of jail.119 She was not allowed to use a
112. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at
¶¶ 13–14 (stating that Ms. Edwards suffered physical illness, including fainting, after being overwhelmed
with terror by the thought of getting arrested by Oregon police over the RTO debt).
113. See, e.g., Chris Serres, Debt Lockup, 33 IRE J. 4, 4 (2010) (In a six-part series investigating debtrelated lawsuits filed in Minnesota, the reporters found warrants issued in “3,200 debt-related cases since
2005, with the numbers of such cases soaring 60 percent in 2009.”).
114. See Jim Gallagher, Payday Lenders Use Courts To Create Modern Debtor’s Prison, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/payday-lenders-use-courts-tocreate-modern-debtors-prison/article_f56ca6aa-e880-11e1-b154-0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/9V
Y2-W 4M8].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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bail bondsman. This meant she had to pay the full $1,250 amount, instead of a
fraction of that amount, to be released.120 Desperate to get out of jail so that she
could keep her job, Ms. Shaw, a single mother of a toddler, ended up spending
three days in jail before her mother obtained the $1,250 needed to secure Ms.
Shaw’s freedom.121
Ms. Shaw’s story is not an isolated case. Missouri courts do not keep track of
the number of body attachment orders issued in cases involving civil debts.122
However, Legal Services of Eastern Missouri found that one attorney who
represents creditors requested fifty-five debtors to appear for oral examinations
and had requested twenty-three body attachment orders in 2011 and 2012 alone,
resulting in the arrests of seven people.123 News stories and legal notices in
Missouri and other states describe creditors obtaining civil contempt orders after
debtors have failed to appear for an oral examination.124
Like Missouri, every state has a post-judgment procedural process for
creditors to invoke to try to satisfy a judgment.125 That process may start with the
creditor’s request for the debtor to answer written interrogatories or appear at
an oral examination.126 Ostensibly, this post-judgment hearing allows a creditor
to discover whether the debtor has assets to pay the judgment by allowing the
creditor to ask questions and request documents and other information regarding
assets.127 If a debtor fails to appear, the creditor can then obtain a hearing to show
cause in order to hold the debtor in civil contempt.128 After the debtor fails to
appear at the show-cause hearing, state statutes authorize the issuance of an
arrest warrant (or body attachment in Missouri) allowing local police to arrest
the debtor without any further opportunity to appear before the court.129 The bail
is usually set at an amount equal to or higher than the debt owed.130 Once paid

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. In some communities, the local newspaper identifies individuals arrested on the basis of civil
contempt for failing to appear in court. See, e.g., Arrests, DAILY REV. ATLAS (Monmouth, Ill.) (Sept. 2,
2015), 2015 WLNR 29323083 (reporting arrests of individuals residing in Warren County and adjacent
counties). Investigative reporters have occasionally sifted through court filings and discovered that
creditors are increasingly using the civil contempt process in debt-related cases. See, e.g., Serres, supra
note 113.
125. See, e.g., 5A COLO. PRAC., HANDBOOK ON CIVIL LITIGATION § 12:1, 2–3 (2015).
126. See, e.g., JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT § 11.11 (3d ed. 2016) (stating that
“[d]iscovery concerning a judgment debtor’s assets may be had by way of written interrogatories or
through oral examination”).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., 6B Fed. Proc. Forms § 19:162 (“After the defendant is taken into custody, he or she
may contest the issuance of the arrest order by challenging its legality or the defendant may post bond in
an amount sufficient to insure the satisfaction of a judgment on plaintiff’s claim and thereby secure his
or her release”).
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by the consumer, it is turned over to the creditor.131 In some jurisdictions, like
Missouri, the person must pay the full amount of the bail to be released.132
Moreover, because the consumer has not technically been charged with a crime,
the consumer has no right to a court-appointed attorney.133 Unsophisticated and
unrepresented consumers are easily intimidated into finding a way to pay in order
to get out of jail.
B. Creditor’s Request For An Oral Examination Of The Debtor Is a Pretext To
Achieving a Civil Contempt Order And Arrest Warrant
Without a lawyer, the typical consumer will not be able to determine whether
creditors are intentionally misusing the civil contempt process. Most consumers
do not file an answer to complaints involving debt collection and most do not
appear in court to defend themselves.134 This is because the majority of consumers
cannot afford to hire a consumer lawyer to represent them.135 Creditors, including

131. See, e.g., Kelly M. Greco & Stephanie R. Hammer, No More ‘Debtors’ Prison’: Greater Notice,
Protections for Judgment Debtors, 101 ILL. B.J. 134, 136 (2013) (discussing that prior to the 2012 changes
in Illinois law, “when issuing a body attachment for failure to appear, judges [in Illinois] would often set
the debtor’s release bond at the amount of the debt and then turn the bond money over to the creditor”).
Proving the legality or illegality of the money being immediately turned over to the creditor and not to
the clerk of court is beyond the scope of this article. The point here is to show that creditors are
incentivized to use the civil contempt process as a debt collection tactic if consumers find a way to pay,
and the money is then immediately given to the creditors.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. RULE 31.02(a) (describing when a person accused of a crime is entitled a
court-appointed attorney). Wakita Shaw is a resident of St. Louis Missouri, which is not far from
Ferguson, where Michael Brown, an unarmed African-American teen, was shot to death by a police
officer. Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy Responses to
Modern Debtors’ Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 98 (2015). Many issues came to light from civil
protests about his death. Id. at 98. Relevant to this article was the practice among Ferguson police officers
of issuing traffic citations to mostly African-American residents of Ferguson. Id. (“Investigations that
sought to illuminate the causes and scope of community resentment and unrest in Ferguson revealed that
a largely White police force issued numerous minor citations to the city’s majority Black residents.
Citations carried steep costs that would grow quickly over time if an individual did not pay promptly—
such that a single ticket with a $151 fine could balloon to a debt of more than $1,000.”). In a pending
federal lawsuit against the Ferguson, the district court allowed the plaintiffs to go forward with their
equal protection claim that the Ferguson violated their constitutional rights by incarcerating them over
unpaid traffic fines but not assigning court-appointed counsel for the indigent plaintiffs. See Fant v. City
of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
134. The fact that consumers do not respond to debt collection complaints is without controversy and
that has been the case for decades. See, e.g., Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec., Fed. Trade Comm’n to
The Honorable Richard Cordray, Director, CFPB, (F.T.C. Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-enforcement-fair-debt-collection-practices-ac
t-report-consumer-financial/160217cfpbreport2015fdcpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWC6-H4XT].
135. See APRIL KUEHNHOFF & CHERIE CHING, DEFUSING DEBT: A SURVEY OF DEBT-RELATED
CIVIL LEGAL AID PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (June 2016), http://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/debt_collection/debt-defense-survey-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CR3-2LRM] (stating that the debt
collection industry makes over a billion contacts with consumers annually and files lawsuits against
millions and finding that companies obtain default judgments against consumers in the vast majority of
those cases). The majority of consumers that seek free legal representation are turned away due to
reduced funding available to legal aid organizations. Id. at 1. See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Middle-Class
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debt collection companies, already know that in most consumer debt cases, they
will obtain a default judgment.136 Because the trajectory in consumer debt cases
usually leads to a default judgment, some creditors have exploited the consumer’s
lack of response and sophistication to evade consumer protection laws in various
ways, including by getting default judgments on time-barred debts137 and using
default judgments to unlawfully garnish consumers’ wages.138 This means the
filing of a lawsuit in a consumer debt case yields low-hanging fruit, and sometimes
that fruit is unlawfully obtained. Thus, unscrupulous creditors already have an
incentive to use civil litigation to unlawfully collect debts from consumers.
Given that civil litigation is used against consumers to unlawfully collect
debts, payday lenders and other high-cost lenders misuse civil contempt because
they know or have reason to know that an oral examination is not likely to reveal
assets that can lawfully be seized and sold. Therefore, the oral examination
request is a pretext for reaching the ultimate goal of obtaining a civil contempt
order and arrest warrant. Three main insights support this contention.
First, the high-cost lenders described in this article have established business
models that extend exorbitantly priced credit to consumers who have no other
options to satisfy their credit needs and are, therefore, financially vulnerable.139
Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, AM. B. ASS’N J. (July 22, 2010, 1:36 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/middleclass_dilemma_cant_afford_lawyers_cant_qualify_for_le
gal_aid (explaining why middle-class individuals cannot afford legal representation).
136. KUEHNHOFF & CHING, supra note 135, at 1.
137. See, e.g., Diaz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 3920, 2012 WL 1882976, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (“Defendants’ filing of the [current lawsuit] was part of a ‘policy and practice’
whereby Defendants intentionally filed time-barred claims ‘knowing that the vast majority of claims filed
will result in default judgments or will be contested by unsophisticated pro-se consumers who are
unaware of [state consumer protection law] and its impact upon the statute of limitations.’”).
138. See, e.g., Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1377 (1999) (holding that a bank’s “longarm program” constituted an abuse of process and an unlawful business practice where the bank filed
lawsuits in Virginia courts against its out-of-state credit-card holders, obtained default judgments in more
than ninety percent of the cases, and collected millions using Virginia’s garnishment procedures to
garnish the wages of out-of-state cardholders).
139. For instance, the crux of the payday lending business model is to lend money to creditchallenged consumers who need cash to pay a bill and who lack any other viable options to solve their
financial crisis. See generally Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do
Payday and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524 (2012).
Furthermore, car title lenders, RTO companies, and other high-cost lenders extend credit to cashstrapped consumers with bad credit. Id. Women and minorities are disproportionately represented
among payday loan borrowers, RTO customers, and car title borrowers. See, e.g., id.; Kathryn Fritzdixon
et al., Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014
U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1029 (2014) (reporting findings of a study, and specifically finding “women are
slightly more likely than men to use auto title loans” and that this finding is similar to demographic data
showing that “[w]omen are also more likely to use payday loans, pawnshops, and rent-to-own services”).
Evidence suggests that women and minorities are specifically targeted by predatory lenders. See, e.g., Jim
Hawkins, Are Bigger Companies Better for Low-Income Borrowers?: Evidence from Payday and Title
Loan Advertisements, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 303, 325 (2015) (reporting the results of the author’s study
of advertisements by payday and car title lenders and finding “[l]arge companies are more likely to have
storefront advertisements aimed at racial minorities than small companies at a statistically significant
level, and large companies are more likely to have websites dominated by pictures of racial minorities”).
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All of these companies charge triple-digit (or higher) interest rates and impose
loan repayment terms that make it likely that consumers will default and will
enter into long-term cycles of indebtedness140 or lose possession of their assets.141
As a result, these high-cost lenders are subject to state and federal regulations to
curb their lending practices and are targeted in pending federal regulations
announced by the CFPB.142
Second, financial data revealed about consumers who rely on high-cost
consumer credit further highlights the pretextual nature of requests for oral
examinations. In comparison to individuals who do not obtain high-cost loans,
consumers that use the high-cost forms of consumer credit have lower income,
lack savings, and have less wealth (for instance, they are not likely to be
homeowners).143 Because consumers who obtain exorbitantly priced loans have
less income, garnishment of their wages by creditors may result in smaller
payments over time from the consumer’s income. This is because applicable
140. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS ON PAYDAY, PAYDAY
INSTALLMENT, AND VEHICLE TITLE LOANS, AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS 111 (2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Supplemental_Report_060116.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLR3
-8ZDH] [hereinafter CFPB’S 2016 SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS] (reporting results from data collection
that included over twelve million payday loans issued in thirty states within a twelve-month period and
finding that “[o]ver 80% of payday loans are reborrowed within 14 days from the same lender, 85% are
reborrowed within 30 days, and 88% are reborrowed within 60 days”); Ann Constable, Judge Orders
FastBucks to Pay Restitution to Borrowers, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.santa
fenewmexican.com/news/local_news/judge-orders-fastbucks-to-pay-restitution-to-borrowers/article_01f
ea39d-4be3-5eb8-80fc-f2b8efcbd057.html [https://perma.cc/88E2-SY3F] (announcing a victory by the
New Mexico Attorney General in a case it filed against FastBucks, a payday lender that issued
“installment” loans to take advantage of consumers to keep them in long-term debt and describing the
testimony of one FastBucks employee who stated: “[w]e just basically don’t let anybody pay off [a
loan]”). See also Decision and Final Order, New Mexico v. Fastbucks Holding Corp., No. D0101-CV2009-01917, at ¶ 15 (N.M. Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.creditslips.org/files/fastbucks-decision-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55UG-VQ93] (“Given borrowers’ financial conditions, it was knowable ab initio that
they would be unable to repay their loans without accruing exorbitant interest.”).
141. See, e.g., Default Judgment and Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Schuette vs. Liquidation,
LLC, No. 16-30-CP, at 5, (June 8, 2016) https://web.archive.org/web/20170416170156/http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/ag/6_8_16_Filed_Default_Judgment__Final_Order_for_Permanent_Injunctio
n_526342_7.pdf (enjoining car title lenders, which were not licensed to do business in Michigan, from
operating in the state and finding that they had unlawfully repossessed at least 154 vehicles from
Michigan residents).
142. In June of 2016, the CFPB proposed new rules to curb the abuses of payday loans, auto title
loans, and other forms of short-term credit. CFPB Proposal Looks to End Payday Loan Debt Traps,
FED. BANKING L. REP. ¶¶ 154–379 (June 2, 2016); Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost
Installment Loans (proposed June 2, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Rulemaking_Payday_Vehicle_Title_Certain_High-Cost_
Installment_Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/76PH-4V5P] [hereinafter CFPB’s Proposed Rules].
143. For an in-depth discussion of the financial data about payday and car title loan borrowers, see
Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title Loans Really
Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524 (2012). See also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v.
Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 999 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The payday industry targets low to
medium income consumers as well as individuals who have no savings, and live paycheck to paycheck.”);
Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2066 (2008) (stating that consumers
who enter into RTO contracts with the intent to own are less likely to have household incomes greater
than $25,000, are less likely to own their homes, and more likely to lack a high school diploma).
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federal and state laws protect the majority (usually seventy-five percent) of a
consumer’s disposable income from attachment.144
In addition to earning less income, consumers who use high-cost credit
disproportionately receive part or all of their income from sources that are
exempted from attachment under federal or state law.145 For example, various
state and federal laws protect child support payments, disability income, Social
Security income, and similar types of income sources.146 As a result, a
garnishment proceeding may yield nothing.147 This may explain why some highcost lenders do not even attempt to directly garnish a consumer’s source of
income before resorting to civil contempt proceedings.
Although laws explicitly protect numerous sources of income, Professor Lea
Shepard and others have found that consumers facing arrest or wanting release
from jail may use exempted income sources to pay the amount that the creditor
claim is owed.148 As a result, creditors that misuse the civil contempt process
circumvent exemption laws by using arrest warrants to coerce consumers into
paying with the same funds that are ostensibly protected by law.
Third, consumers who borrow from high-cost lenders are likely to have
tangible assets (e.g., furniture) protected under personal property exemption
laws and, therefore, lack assets that a creditor can seize and sell.149 Financial data
144. See, e.g., John Terrill & Jennifer Kosteva, Asset Protection Planning: Understanding the Links
and the Conflicts Between Estate Planning and Debtor/Creditor Law, AM. L. INST. 711 (describing
personal property and income exemption laws in the United States, and stating that, for example,
Georgia law allows a creditor to garnish from disposable earnings “the lesser of (i) twenty-five percent
of weekly after-tax earnings and (ii) the amount by which after-tax weekly income exceeds thirty times
the federal minimum hourly wage”).
145. See, e.g., CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING, CFPB OFF. RES. (Mar. 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9396-DS
7Q] (reporting data that shows, among other things, that the majority of borrowers who are paid monthly
receive income from governmental benefits, such as Social Security payments and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI)).
146. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2010) (“The right of any person to any future [Social Security]
payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.”).
147. See, e.g., Philpott v. Essex Cty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973) (explaining that the
wording in § 407 “imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security
benefits [and] [t]hat is broad enough to include all claimants, including a State”).
148. See, e.g., Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1536 (2011); Brief For
AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, 785 F.3d
1091, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom Sheriff v. Gillie, 193 L. Ed. 495 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2015)
(No. 15-338), available at 2016 WL 878848 (describing how debt collectors threaten to have elderly
consumers arrested and threaten to seize their Social Security checks and explaining the vulnerability of
elderly consumers that may lead them to pay the amount demanded, even when they do not owe it, to
avoid being arrested).
149. Every state has exemption laws that protect a certain amount of personal property, and all or
part of the value of the debtor’s primary residence, from being seized and sold by unsecured creditors
seeking satisfaction of consumer debts. Daniel A. Austin, State Laws, Court Splits, Local Practice Make
Consumer Bankruptcy Anything but “Uniform,” 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1 (2011). In addition to state
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indicates that consumers who obtain high-cost loans lack savings and have fewer
assets, including lacking ownership of a home. If the consumer who borrowed
money from a high-cost lender has no savings in the bank, does not own a house,
and lacks a car (or the car is encumbered by a perfected security interest), then
the odds are very high that the consumer’s remaining personal assets are
comparatively worth little and will be protected under state exemption laws.150
Lawyers who regularly represent creditors in consumer cases should already
know this.151 That is precisely why experienced lawyers recommend that any
attorney representing a creditor first investigate the availability of non-exempt
assets before filing a lawsuit against the debtor.152
The news report about Ms. Shaw revealed a disturbing track record of one
lawyer, Mitchell Jacobs, who regularly represents payday lenders and other
creditors and requests oral examinations.153 In one year, he had summoned
dozens of consumers to appear for oral examinations and, due to the failure of
some to appear, had requested twenty-three body attachment orders (or arrest
warrants), which resulted in the arrests of seven consumers.154 When Mr. Jacobs
was questioned about his practices, he stated: “If they’ve had notice and they fail
to appear, then they get what they deserve.”155 His answer does not indicate these
consumers had non-exempt assets but refused to appear. His track record should
be cause for concern about the misuse of civil contempt because it puts extreme
law, various federal laws provide consumers with a variety of exemptions. See, e.g., ROSEMARY E.
WILLIAMS, 1 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 2:9 n.26 (2d ed. & 2016 Update) (identifying
several exempt property interests, such as payments to winners of the congressional Medal of Honor,
that are available under federal laws and that are not dependent on a person filing bankruptcy).
150. The majority of Americans have personal property items that fall within exemption limits and,
therefore, cannot be seized by unsecured creditors. Moreover, the vast majority of Chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases are labeled as no-asset cases, which means unsecured creditors receive nothing because there are
no assets available to be taken and sold for payment of their debts. See In re Plourde, 418 B.R. 495 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2009) (citing data and stating that in the few Chapter 7 cases where assets exist, unsecured
creditors receive only partial payment of their debts).
151. I spent most of my private practice representing creditors. I was trained to first determine
whether the debtor had non-exempt assets and make sure they were not subject to a pre-existing lien or
a security interest. It was considered unethical to drive up legal fees by filing lawsuits unless we could
determine the debtor had unencumbered, non-exempt assets to satisfy any potential judgment. At the
very least, we were expected to verify whether such assets existed in order to retain our clients and avoid
any potential malpractice lawsuits. Simply obtaining the consumer’s credit report would indicate if the
consumer has a home subject to a mortgage or a car subject to a security interest. For the majority of
consumers, these two assets are the most valuable and if they are already subject to pre-existing perfected
liens, then a judgment creditor, such as a payday lender, has no reason to believe that valuable nonexempt assets exist to satisfy its judgment.
152. “Creditor’s counsel should try to discover what property the debtor has that can be levied
upon . . . , whether such property is subject to liens or encumbrances, and whether there are other
judgments against the debtor.” Evaluating the Claim, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE ENF. J. & DEBT 3-A (2016)
(describing the steps in conducting an investigation of the debtor’s assets and stating that “an
investigation should usually be completed before a creditor decides whether to bring suit against an
uncooperative debtor”).
153. Gallagher, supra note 114.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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pressure on consumers to come up with the money demanded. For example,
Wakita Shaw’s mother borrowed from someone else to get Ms. Shaw out of jail.156
As the late Paul Harvey would say, “here’s the rest of the story”157 about
Wakita Shaw, which shows the payday lender’s oral examination request would
not have led to the discovery of non-exempt assets. Perhaps predictably, a few
months after getting out of jail, Ms. Shaw ended up filing bankruptcy to get a
fresh start from her indebtedness.158 Her bankruptcy petition revealed this
mother of a toddler received part of her income from child support payments—
an exempted source of income that the payday lender could not have garnished.159
The petition also revealed that she did not own a home, and she did not have any
collectible assets because all of her personal property was protected by
exemption laws or subject to security interests.160 The bottom line is that she did
not have any personal property that the payday lender could have seized and
sold. Consequently, one can reasonably conclude the civil contempt process is
exploited by the payday lender to force consumers to get money from someone
else to pay the civil debts owed. Practice-oriented articles even advise lawyers
that they will accomplish receipt of payment from the debtor by following
through on the civil contempt process.161 This paints a picture of extortion.
Therefore, it is time for prosecutors to consider going after creditors that misuse
civil contempt.
C. Creditors’ Abuse Of Civil Contempt Constitutes Extortion
When lenders misuse the civil contempt process, they commit extortion
because the process constitutes an implied threat that consumers will be
prosecuted for committing a crime.162 Once again, the Umana163 case is relevant
because Langshaw argued that her letter, which demanded weekly payments
totaling $50,000, was merely an attempt to settle a legitimate civil claim against
the man she believed had raped her.164 Although Langshaw’s letter stated that
she “would like to settle this matter,” the court held that, in light of her conduct

156. Id.
157. Mr. Harvey was a legendary syndicated radio columnist who hosted a program called “The Rest
of the Story” in which he uncovered and delved in little-known facts behind stories. See generally, PAUL
HARVEY, JR., PAUL HARVEY’S THE REST OF THE STORY (1977).
158. Wakita Shaw, Petition, Case No. 12-50325, (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2012).
159. Id. Sch. I.
160. Id. Schs. A, B & D. Her vehicle was subject to a car title loan. Id. Even her daughter’s bedroom
set was subject to a security interest. Id.
161. See, e.g., Ronald S. Carter, Collection of Contract Debts, MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L
EDUC. LAW., INC. (2012) (“If the debtor again fails to appear for the show cause hearing [regarding the
civil contempt], then file for a body attachment. Body attachments are usually rather effective, as most
debtors do not like to be imprisoned and suddenly find funds for bonds.”).
162. States have criminal extortion statutes that define a threat to accuse someone of a crime as
unlawful. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 519(2) (2015).
163. People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
164. Id. at 639.
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and the entire letter, her letter threatened “to continue accusing the victim of
crime.” Consequently, Langshaw had “the specific intent to extort money and
other property from him.”165
Applying the Umana to the payday lender’s treatment of Wakita Shaw, a
court could conclude that the payday lender committed extortion. Lawfully
initiating the civil contempt process does not shield the lender from an extortion
conviction.166 The news report about Ms. Shaw is silent about her
communications with the lender between the time of her arrest and her release
from jail. After being arrested, either Ms. Shaw or her mother probably tried to
contact the lender’s lawyer to find a way for Ms. Shaw to be released from jail.167
If the lawyer communicated with Ms. Shaw (or with her mother) any words
implying that Ms. Shaw would be released if she paid the debt, then a fact finder
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lender, through its lawyer,
made an implicit threat to continue criminal action against Ms. Shaw until she
paid the debt.168
Regardless of the communications, the creditor’s misuse of civil contempt
created the impression in Ms. Shaw’s mind that she was being arrested for failing
to pay back a loan, not for failing to appear in court. Without legal training,
consumers believe they are being arrested for committing a crime related to the
unpaid debt.169 That belief is justified by the consumer looking at the style or
caption of the written body attachment order because it will have the same
heading as in the initial complaint filed against the consumer.170 If shown the
written order from the court, the lender’s name will still be listed as the plaintiff
and the consumer’s name will still be listed as the defendant.
The consumer’s belief that the arrest is due to an unpaid debt is further
cemented by the fact that once the consumer pays the bail amount, which is

165. Id.
166. The Umana case demonstrates that a defendant cannot avoid an extortion conviction just
because the defendant claims to rely on our civil system of resolving disputes. See, e.g., id. at 640–41.
167. I base this assertion on my law practice experience, which consisted primarily of representing
creditors in state-court collection cases and in bankruptcy cases. It was a common occurrence for a
consumer–debtor to contact me once they had been served with a complaint. I would then tell the
consumer that I represented the creditor and could not give him or her legal advice. I would instruct the
consumer to retain his or her own attorney. Unfortunately, it is incontrovertible that the majority of
Americans do not have access to free or low-cost legal advice. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying
text. For a summer, I worked as attorney at Neighborhood Legal Services Association where I
encountered clients, most of whom were not competent by themselves to deal with a creditor’s attorney.
168. Although this article does not contend that lawyers should be criminally prosecuted, lawyers
have been convicted of extortion on various grounds, including making threats to accuse a client’s
customer of a crime. See, e.g., People v. Beggs, 172 P. 152, 153 (Cal. 1918).
169. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 148, at 1536. In her article describing the use of civil contempt as
a debt collection mechanism, Professor Lea Shepard explains numerous reasons why debtors fail to
appear. A primary reason is the consumer lacks understanding of the implication of failing to appear. Id.
(stating also that “[i]n the area of debt collection, debtors’ lack of sophistication is reflected, among other
things, in their unfamiliarity with their state and federal exemption rights”).
170. See, e.g., Judgment Ordering Body Attachment, 1A Fla. Pl. & Pr. Forms § 6:172.
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turned over to the creditor, the consumer is released from jail.171 As Professor
Alan White explained, “[i]f, in effect, people are being incarcerated until they
pay bail, and bail is being used to pay their debts, then they’re being incarcerated
to pay their debts.”172 Then, according to the holding of Umana, neither the
lender nor its lawyer needed to explicitly accuse Ms. Shaw of committing a crime.
Another recent case supports the conclusion that the payday lender could be
convicted of extortion absent direct threats. In People v. Bollaert, the defendant
operated a website, UGotPosted.com, through which users could post naked and
intimate photographs of individuals, along with their names, locations, and social
media profile links.173 Individuals who wanted their pictures removed were
directed to another Bollaert website, ChangeMyReputation.com, where they
could pay a fee to have the offensive content removed from the other website.174
Bollaert was charged with several crimes, including extortion, and eventually
convicted of extortion based on the threat to expose the secrets of individuals and
subject them to disgrace (namely, shame and humiliation).175
Bollaert challenged the extortion conviction on the basis that he did not
initiate any direct communications to any individuals or make any threats to
those who wanted the offensive content removed.176 The court rejected this
argument and found an implicit threat from the fact that the offensive content
would not be removed unless the victims paid.177 Bollaert’s actions had already
taken away (or at least invaded) the victims’ privacy and constituted an implicit
threat to subject them to continued disgrace, embarrassment, and humiliation by
keeping the intimate photos on his website if they failed to pay the required fee.178
Similar to the Bollaert case, an implicit threat can be found in the fact that the
payday lender, via its lawyer, had already taken Ms. Shaw’s freedom by having
her arrested over a civil debt and that she could only be freed if she paid what
was demanded. According to the reasoning in the Bollaert decision, neither the
171. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 114.
172. Chris Serres, Debtors and the New Breed of Collectors: Is Jailing Debtors the Same as Debtors’
Jail?, STAR TRIB., June 6, 2010, at A9.
173. People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). This type of website is commonly
referred to as a “revenge porn” website where jilted ex-spouses and lovers can shame their exes by
posting nude or similar photos of them online. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of
State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 775 (2017).
174. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 819.
175. Besides inducing fear based on a threat to accuse someone of crime, as was the case in Umana,
California law also states that extortion includes inducing fear by a threat “[t]o expose, or impute to [a
person] . . . a deformity, disgrace, or crime” or “expose a secret affecting him [or her].” CAL. PENAL
CODE § 519.
176. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 820.
177. Id. at 837 (“The fact Bollaert did not take affirmative action to seek out or contact the victims,
but merely responded to the victims’ pleas to remove their content, does not render the threat element
unsupported by the evidence.”).
178. Id. (“There is no question based on the victims’ testimony that the display of their private images
and information subjected them to shame, disgrace and embarrassment as to their reputation and
character, and would continue to be exposed to other people if the content was not removed”).
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lender nor its lawyer needed to initiate contact with Ms. Shaw after her arrest.
Similar to the victims in Bollaert who had already been subjected to humiliation,
Ms. Shaw was already sitting in jail, ostensibly for committing a crime due the
lender’s misuse of civil contempt. Because jail is for those accused of crimes, it
was reasonable for Ms. Shaw to infer that she had been accused of a crime and
that the lender would continue accusing her of a crime related to the payday loan
debt. She could only get out of jail by heeding the demands of the payday lender
to pay. That amounts to extortion.
D. Creditors Cannot Hide Behind Their Technically Legal Use Of Civil
Contempt Or Their Belief That The Consumer Owed a Debt
Creditors may contend that because the civil contempt process is legal, they
do not have the requisite intent to commit a crime. But in numerous contexts,
courts have held that asserting a claim of right can nevertheless constitute
extortion when it is used to get money or other property from the victim. For
instance, in Roberts v. State, a Texas appellate court upheld the conviction of a
defendant who claimed that he was relying on a civil rule when he asked for a
settlement of potential claims.179 The defendant, Ted Roberts, sent drafts of
discovery petitions to four men that had had sexual affairs with his wife.180 Under
Texas’ rules of civil procedure, before filing a lawsuit, a person can file a petition
to obtain a discovery order to allow that person to obtain deposition testimony
from someone else.181 The purpose of this pre-lawsuit discovery rule is to “to
perpetuate the testimony of witnesses for use in an anticipated suit” and “to
investigate a potential claim or suit.”182 In the petitions, Roberts requested the
court’s permission to investigate potential claims and highlighted various sections
of the Texas Penal Code.183 He asked the four men to settle his potential claims
against them by either paying him directly or sending money to his favorite
charity.184 All four paid the amount requested and signed agreements to settle
Roberts’ claims against them.185 Roberts was eventually convicted of two crimes,
one constituting theft by coercion.186

179. Roberts v. State, 278 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App. 2008).
180. Id. at 783–84.
181. TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 202.1(b) (“A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the
taking of a deposition or oral examination or written questions . . . to investigate a potential claim or
suit.”).
182. KNOX D. NUNNALLY & RONALD G. FRANKLIN, 3 TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE TORTS § 12:122
(2016 Update).
183. Roberts, 278 S.W.3d at 785.
184. Id. at 784–87.
185. Id. at 785–88.
186. Id. at 790. Under Texas law, a person commits theft if he “unlawfully appropriates property with
intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(a) (2015). The appropriation of
property is “unlawful” when it is without the owner’s effective consent. TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(b)
(2015). Consent is lacking if obtained by coercion, which includes threats to accuse a person of an offense
or expose the person to ridicule or contempt. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(9)(C)–(D) (2011).
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Under Texas law, threats amounting to coercion include threats “to accuse a
person of any offense,” to “expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule,” or
to “harm the credit or business repute of any person.”187 The court concluded that
the testimonies of Roberts’ victims were sufficient to support his conviction for
making those threats.188 For example, one man testified that he believed the
petition draft Roberts gave to him was a threat to accuse him of various crimes
arising from his affair with Roberts’ wife.189 Another victim testified that he
settled because he believed the petition, if filed, “would be embarrassing,”
“would cause people to lose confidence in him,” and would cause him to lose his
job.190 Therefore, the court held that a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Roberts used coercion to obtain the settlements, and that his use of the
discovery petitions was “not based on his reliance on the validity of his legal
claims but in an effort to threaten and deceive the men.”191
Likewise, a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a lender’s use of
the civil contempt process is employed to obtain an arrest warrant to coerce
consumers into paying out of fear of being charged with a crime if they do not
pay. Although one of the victims in Roberts thought he was being accused of
crime, most people know that committing adultery is not a crime in the United
States.192 However, consumers who are arrested via civil contempt have every
reason to believe they are being accused of a crime. If they are told they can be
released if they pay in full, that information would confirm their perception that
they have been accused of a crime arising from the unpaid civil debt.
Consequently, creditors cannot escape an extortion conviction simply by
asserting that they legally used civil contempt to have consumers arrested.
Similarly, creditors cannot avoid an extortion conviction by asserting as a
defense the fact that the victim owed a valid debt. In People v. Fichtner,193 the
court upheld the convictions of two defendants who threatened to have a person
prosecuted for shoplifting after he had stolen food items.194 After the defendants
made several demands, the accused shoplifter signed an agreement requiring
restitution by immediately paying $25 to the defendants and promising to pay the
remaining debt balance in installments.195 Appealing their convictions, the
defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed not to convict if the

187. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(9)(C)–(E) (2011).
188. Roberts, 278 S.W.3d at 793.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 794.
192. Adultery is still a crime in some countries. See, e.g., Carlin Moore et al., International Legal
Updates, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 36, 41 (2009) (stating that Iran had executed individuals for various crimes,
including adultery).
193. People v. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
194. Id. at 394, 399.
195. Id. at 394.
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defendants honestly believed the victim owed the money.196 The court disagreed
and held that such a jury instruction would be incorrect under the law.197 The
bottom line is that public policy condemns the means by which these defendants
choose to collect debts.198
In accordance with the reasoning of People v. Fichtner, creditors that misuse
civil contempt cannot escape extortion convictions because this collection
practice contravenes public policy as it terrorizes consumers into paying civil
debts. Likewise, creditors that initiate criminal charges, or that only threaten to
do so, should not be able to avoid extortion convictions because these practices
constitute unlawful collection methods that violate public policy, even when civil
debts are legitimately owed.

196. Id. at 396.
197. “[D]efendants may properly be convicted even though they believed that the complainant was
guilty of the theft of their employer’s goods in an amount either equal to or less, or greater than any sum
of money obtained from the complainant.” Id. Some courts require that the defendant’s threat amount
to doing something unlawful (for example, threatening to kill the victim unless she pays or taking money
not owed by the victim). See, e.g., United States v. Vigil, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1305 (D.N.M. 2007) (“The
Court concludes that the term ‘wrongful’ applies when a defendant attempts to extort property to which
he has no lawful claim—irrespective of the extortion method employed.”). And many scholars argue for
this standard. See Stuart P. Green, Theft by Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44
WASHBURN L.J. 553, 556 (2005) (conceding that the federal extortion statute “does not explicitly require
that the defendant threaten to do an ‘unlawful’ act” but arguing that the term “wrongfulness” in the
statute should be interpreted to mean “unlawfulness”). To the extent case law interprets extortion
statutes to require such a showing of unlawfulness, state lawmakers need to amend those statutes to make
it clear that even threats to do something lawful amount to extortion if done to induce fear in the victim
in order to coerce a payment from the victim. See generally Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail
Paradox: The Common Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051,
1065 (2007) (stating that laws prohibiting extortive threats exist to protect individuals from “undue fear
and anxiety”).
198. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 396. Courts have consistently held that the law denounces the means
by which payment is sought. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 81 F.3d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1996) (California law)
(holding that it is the “means employed which the law denounces” as extortion even if the defendant was
motivated to collect a just debt); Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1990) (New Mexico law)
(upholding defendant’s extortion conviction because that phrase “to wrongfully compel” refers to the
threats he used to compel action from the victim and not to “the legitimacy of the defendant’s objective”);
United States v. Zappola, 523 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 677 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1982) (federal
law) (analyzing federal extortion statute under the Hobbs Act and holding that where the threats used
to obtain the money are “explicitly and unequivocally proscribed by the relevant statutes,” the defendant
cannot escape conviction because he believed in the validity of the debt owed by the victim); Moore v.
Newell, 401 F. Supp. 1018, 1020–21 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aff’d, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding
extortion conviction for making non-violent threats and stating that the “statute concerns the method by
which a payment is sought”) Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 932 n.46 (Mass. 2010)
(Massachusetts law) (holding that a threat made to enforce payment of a “just debt” is still extortion).
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IV
CRIMINALIZATION TACTICS CIRCUMVENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITIONS ON INCARCERATION FOR CIVIL DEBTS AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS
Creditors that employ consumer debt criminalization practices are not just
committing extortion, they are also violating state constitutions that prohibit
incarcerating individuals for failure to pay civil debts.199 In addition, some states
have laws that specifically prohibit creditors from threatening to have consumers
arrested.200 Thus, if prosecutors let creditors get away with extorting consumers
by using criminalization tactics, prosecutors will, in essence, allow creditors to
violate consumers’ constitutional and statutory rights to live free from the terror
of being arrested over civil debts.
A. Most State Constitutions In Theory Protect Consumers From
Criminalization
Most states have constitutional provisions that ban incarceration of
individuals for civil debts or severely limit the instances in which incarceration is
permitted.201 Once again, Wakita Shaw’s case provides a poignant illustration of
how creditors can evade a state’s constitutional protection of its citizens. Ms.
Shaw is resident of Missouri, which has the following constitutional provision:
“no person shall be imprisoned for debt, except for nonpayment of fines and
penalties imposed by law.”202 Missouri case law holds that this constitutional ban

199. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16 (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action,
or mesnse or final process, unless in cases of fraud.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“A person may not be
imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, or in peacetime for a militia fine.”); OHIO CONST., art. 1, §
15 (same as Arkansas’ constitution).
200. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.10(e) (California law prohibits a “threat to any person that
nonpayment of the consumer debt may result in the arrest of the debtor or the seizure, garnishment,
attachment or sale of any property . . . , unless such action is in fact contemplated by the debt collector
and permitted by law.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(1)(e) (prohibiting the making of a “false threat
that nonpayment of a debt may result in the arrest of a person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment
or sale of property or wages of that person”); TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.301(a)(5) (Under Texas law, “debt
collector[s] may not use threats, coercion, or attempts to coerce” that involve “threatening that the debtor
will be arrested for nonpayment of a consumer debt without proper court proceedings.”); WASH.
REVISED CODE ANN. § 19.16.250(13) (banning several collection practices, including attempting to
collect from the debtor by using “threats of force or violence,” and “threats of criminal prosecution”).
These state law prohibitions are similar to the federal prohibition under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4) (2006) (prohibiting debt collectors from making “[t]he
representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of
any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless
such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action”).
201. For a comprehensive list of states that either ban or limit incarceration of individuals over civil
debts, see Christopher Hampson, Appendix, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1024 (2016), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
vol129_Note1024Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXC6-SD5X] (identifying and quoting text from fortyone state constitutions that ban or substantially limit incarceration).
202. MO. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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on imprisonment applies to contractual debts; that is, money due directly under
a contract, as well as to judgment debts arising from litigation over unpaid
contractual debts.203
In a case involving a debtor’s default on a promissory note given in exchange
for money lent, the Missouri Court of Appeals made it clear that the debt came
within the purview of the constitutional prohibition.204 In Estate of Downs, the
creditor’s estate sued and obtained a judgment against the debtor.205 After the
estate’s attempt to garnish the debtor’s assets yielded nothing, the estate moved
the probate court for a civil contempt order against the debtor for failure to pay
the judgment debt.206 The estate argued that the debtor was in contempt for
failing to pay a specific fund of money,207 and the contempt order was, therefore,
permissible under the constitution. This argument was implausible because the
estate had already tried unsuccessfully to reach that specific fund in a prior
garnishment proceeding.208 The Missouri Court of Appeals saw the estate’s use
of civil contempt for what it really was—an attempt to get around the constitution
and case law holding that the constitutional ban applies to attempts to collect
debts arising from litigation over unpaid contractual debts.209 Because the estate
knew that the debtor was no longer in possession of the specific funds, the civil
contempt order and subsequent body attachment resulting in the debtor’s
imprisonment violated the Missouri constitution.210
Like the creditor in Estate of Downs, the payday lender can raise a similar
technical distinction—Ms. Shaw was arrested for failing to appear, not for failing
to pay. The reality, however, is that the lender had no reason to believe Ms. Shaw
had money or assets that could be used to pay the debt but simply refused to
appear for the oral examination. The lender used the civil contempt process to
force a payment, not a court appearance. Moreover, the data demonstrates that
payday lenders and other high-cost lenders profit from extending credit to
consumers who have no money to meet their financial obligations, which is why
203. See, e.g., In re Estate of Downs, 300 S.W.3d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
204. See, e.g., id.
205. Id. at 244.
206. Id. 245.
207. See id. at 248.
208. Id. The fund could not be reached because it was no longer in the possession or control of the
debtor. Id.
209. Missouri case law holds that it is permissible under the state constitution to order the judgment
debtor to turnover a specific fund containing money. Id.
210. The court stated in relevant part:
[I]t is undisputed that [the debtor] cannot return those specific funds because he no longer has
that fund in his possession . . . Thus, the trial court’s order held [the debtor] in contempt for
failing to repay money from his own resources to satisfy an obligation that arose from a
consensual transaction between a creditor and a debtor. This is the definition of a debt for the
purposes of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debts. The trial court’s order
imprisoning [the debtor] for failing to repay the promissory note violates Missouri’s
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debts.
Id. at 248.
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they come to these high-cost lenders in the first place.211 Therefore, high-cost
lenders should not be able evade constitutional protections by misusing civil
contempt or filing police reports212 to initiate the arrest of consumers who are
unable to pay civil debts.213
B. Creditors Are Evading Consumer Protection Laws That Ban Criminalization
Of Consumers Who Cannot Pay
Besides skirting state constitutions, creditors that use criminalization tactics
are also evading state consumer protection laws.214 The federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) bans threats of criminal prosecution to collect

211. See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the payday lender knew, or
should have known, as a business licensed to operate in Missouri, that the payday loan statute banned
the bad-check prosecution of consumers, like Ms. Shaw, who are unable to pay a loan where a post-dated
check was used to obtain it. See VERNON’S ANN. MO. STATUTES § 408.505(8) (“A person does not
commit the crime of passing a bad check pursuant to section 570.120 if at the time the payee accepts a
check or similar sight order for the payment of money, he or she does so with the understanding that the
payee will not present it for payment until later and the payee knows or has reason to believe that there
are insufficient funds on deposit with the drawee at the time of acceptance.”); ERIC ZIEGENHORN, 7
MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, LEGAL FORMS § 33:30 (3d ed. & 2016 Update) (citing to § 408.505 and
stating that “[r]eceiving a payday loan on the basis of a check for which sufficient funds are not present
at the time of writing does not constitute the crime of passing a bad check”). The payday lender was,
therefore, violating the spirit of this consumer protection provision by having consumers, like Wakita
Shaw, arrested via civil contempt. Several states, either by statute or case law, protect payday loan
customers from being prosecuted for passing a bad check. See, e.g., infra notes 255–262 and
accompanying text.
212. See supra Part III.
213. Missouri courts have stated that they have the power to punish for contempt “but only if the
judicial function is integrally threatened,” and that this power “should be used sparingly, wisely,
temperately and with judicial self-restraint.” Estate of Dothage v. Dothage, 727 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (citing McMilian v. Rennau, 619 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). “The power should
be exercised only when necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of, or interference with, the
administration of justice.” Id. Ms. Shaw’s failure to appear did not in any way threaten the Missouri court
system or its administration of justice. Scholars and attorneys have provided several reasons why
consumers fail to appear, and a primary reason is that they do not understand the document requiring
their appearance and do not realize that being arrested is a consequence of failing to appear. See Shepard,
supra note 148, at 1536. Moreover, they do not want to lose income by being forced to take a vacation
day or unpaid time off from work. In short, the creditors know that the majority of consumers fail to
answer a complaint and fail to appear in debt collection cases; creditors exploit that lack of response. See
supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text. As a result, the civil contempt is being misused by payday
lenders and others to perpetrate an injustice—the fast-tracking of payments of civil debts from consumers
who believe they have been charged with a crime—all in violation of the state constitution.
214. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Counsel in Support of Petitioners, Henson v. Santander
Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017) (No. 16-349), 2017 WL 818308 (describing how the debt
collection industry has grown from collecting only 3 billion dollars per year in 1977 to collecting 750
billion annually and explaining how due, in part, to the growth in technology, states are even less effective
in protecting their residents from unlawful collection activities than they were forty years ago).
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a debt.215 However, the FDCPA applies only to debt collectors,216 not original
creditors that collect their own debts.217 That means, for example, Virginia
Robinson could have sued the repo company, which was acting to collect a debt
owed to another, for violating the FDCPA, but she could have not sued Fast Auto
Loans for violating the FDCPA if it had chosen to collect its own debts directly.218
Many states have consumer protection laws that, unlike the FDCPA, prohibit
both creditors and debt collectors from engaging in unlawful collection practices,
including threatening prosecution to collect debts.219 For instance, the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act states that it applies to any
company collecting debts.220 Courts have interpreted the act to explicitly apply to
creditors collecting their own debts.221 In the lawsuit against the FAL defendants
mentioned in part II.A, the West Virginia Attorney General, relying on state law,
obtained a settlement of FAL’s numerous alleged violations, including
threatening the arrests of consumers who fail to pay or relinquish possession of
their vehicles.222
215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lensch v. Armada Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d
1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that state law was preempted by the FDCPA’s prohibition on
threatening arrest and, thereby, upheld the FDCPA’s purpose “to prevent debt collectors from making
empty threats as a way to coerce payment from consumers”); Liggins v. May Co., 373 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio
Ct. Common Pleas 1977).
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2016).
217. Id. at § 1692a(6)(A).
218. See supra notes 25–61 and accompanying text (describing actions taken by a repo man to coerce
Ms. Robinson into relinquishing ownership of her vehicle to Fast Auto Loans, the lender—original
creditor—that had lent her money and obtained a security interest in her vehicle). Courts have held that
the FDCPA applies to repo companies and prohibits them, for example, from using non-judicial actions
to repossesses a consumer’s vehicle when there is no present right to repossess, such as when the
consumer is not in default. See, e.g., Buzzell v. Citizens Auto. Fin., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn.
2011); Alexander v. Blackhawk Recovery and Investigation, L.L.C., 731 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. Mich.
2010).
219. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
220. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-122(d) (2013).
221. See, e.g., Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 266 S.E.2d 905, 909 (W. Va. 1980) (“[T]he
plain meaning of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-122 requires that the provisions of article 2 of Chapter 46A
regulating improper debt collection practices in consumer credit sales must be applied alike to all who
engage in debt collection, be they professional debt collectors or creditors collecting their own debts.”).
Most courts interpreting state statutes that address unlawful debt collection practices have held that these
statutes are applicable to both debt collection companies and original creditors. See 2 CONSUMER LAW
SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 675 (2016). See, e.g., Liggins v. May Co., 373 N.E.2d
404, 406 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1977) (holding that Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act applies to
both creditors and debt collection companies attempting to collect consumer debts); State ex rel. Fisher
v. Lasson, No. CV 92 10 0193, 1994 WL 912252 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1994) (consent entry) (although
defendants, the original creditors, did not admit to specific violations in a court-approved consent decree,
the court made several conclusions of law, including that defendants committed unconscionable practices
in violation of state law, when they threated consumers with jail time for failing to pay membership fees).
222. WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 11. See also W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-124(b)
(making an unlawful debt collection practice “[t]he accusation or threat to accuse any person of fraud,
any crime, or any conduct which, if true, would tend to disgrace such other person or in any way subject
him to ridicule, or any conduct which, if true, would tend to disgrace such other person or in any way
subject him to ridicule or contempt of society”).
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While West Virginia’s residents benefitted from a favorable settlement
obtained against the FAL defendants, many consumers reside in states where
consumer protection laws do not apply to creditors collecting their own debts. As
a result, creditors that criminalize consumers in those stages regularly avoid
liability.
Recent FTC and CFPB reports on debt collection practices make it clear that
the practice of threatening consumers with arrest is a nation-wide problem.223
Companies that occasionally get caught may pay a fine, but that is not enough to
deter criminalization practices. The occasional imposition of fines is simply
factored into the company’s operating cost under a profitable business practice.
Federal and state enforcement actions demonstrate that creditors and debt
collection companies are so successful in their criminalization practices that they
frequently get consumers to pay phantom debts and other debts that are no
longer lawful to collect.224
In summary, creditors should not be able to circumvent consumer protection
laws and state constitutions via criminalization tactics. When creditors evade
consumer protection laws and state constitutions, they make a mockery of each
state’s citizens, who, through the democratic process, have decided that
individuals should not live in fear of imprisonment or be incarcerated for failing
to pay civil debts.225
V
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM CRIMINALIZATION
PRACTICES
Lawmakers should enact legislation to deter criminalization practices because
they inflict substantial harm on consumers and their families, the judicial system,

223. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 14, at 18
(reporting that among complaints by debt collectors to take illegal action, most of them are threats to “to
arrest or jail consumers if they do not pay”). In addition to the high-cost lenders discussed in this article,
creditors that issue traditional forms of consumer credit have been sued for allegedly collecting phantom
debts. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB
ANNUAL REPORT 2016 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb-fair-debt-collectionpractices-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/ EK8Q-ZVRP] (discussing Chase’s $90 million settlement of an
enforcement action filed by the CFPB alleging that Chase sold to debt buyers credit card accounts that
included phantom debts, along with debts that were overstated or time-barred by the statute of
limitations).
224. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 223. Consumers often succumb to abusive debt
collection tactics by paying zombie debts, which are debts that are not legitimately owed, but have been
transferred from the original creditor to a debt collector or debt buyer. See, e.g., Neil L. Sobol, Protecting
Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M.L. REV. 327, 327–28 (2014) (stating that zombie debt
may not be lawfully owed for several reasons, including that it has already been paid to the original
creditor, it has expired under the statute of limitations, or it has been discharged in a consumer’s
bankruptcy case).
225. Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech,
48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (1995) (“[C]onstitutional theory presumes that citizens in a well-functioning
constitutional democracy will upon reflection affirm fundamental constitutional values”).
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and society at large.226 A summary of the harm is followed by a discussion of
plausible solutions.
Consumers subjected to criminalization tactics suffer financial, emotional,
physical, and reputational harm.227 Consumers who are only threatened with
arrest are at least emotionally harmed because, living in terror, they are robbed
of their peace of mind and sometimes become physically ill.228 Consumers who
comply with the creditor’s demands are financially harmed when they relinquish
ownership of personal property, pay unlawful fees and interests, or, tragically,
pay phantom debts.229 Payday loan customers, credit card holders, student loan

226. See, e.g., supra note 121 and accompanying text (Wakita Shaw’s mother borrowed money to get
her out of jail, and then Ms. Shaw herself eventually filed bankruptcy); Johnson, supra note 7, at 11–12
(After getting arrested, Laquetta Hall borrowed money from someone else to pay off debt owed to a
RTO company).
227. See, e.g., supra notes 70–106 and accompanying text (describing the criminalization tactics
perpetrated by a RTO company against Janellen Edwards, who suffered financial harm by having to give
up her furniture and extreme emotional distress after enduring repeated threatening phone calls from
RTO dealer’s employees who showed up at her home more than once). Patricia Haase lost ownership of
her vehicle after a car title lender used the police to unlawfully repossess her vehicle. See Johnson, supra
note 7, at 47–54 (describing how the car title lender’s criminalization tactics amounted to financial abuse
and stating that the lender was ordered to pay compensatory and punitive damages for its unlawful
collection and repossession practices against Ms. Haase). Additionally, Christina McHan, after her
payday lender filed a police report against her, was arrested and spent the night in jail. See, e.g., Wilder,
supra note 2. Virginia Robinson was financially harmed when the FAL never gave her surplus funds in
excess of the debt owed after repossessing and selling her car. See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh.
J. at 2. She suffered reputational and emotional harm as well when collectors came to her workplace and
spoke about her indebtedness with her coworkers. Id.
228. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
70, at ¶ 20, (“Plaintiff [Janellen Edwards] suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the ongoing
pattern of threats, intimidation and humiliation she endured as a result of TRS’s conduct. She
experienced migraine headaches, nausea, elevated heart rate, difficulty breathing, stabbing pains in her
chest around her heart, loss of appetite, difficulty sleeping, upset stomach, severe anxiety, depression,
and apprehension. She was humiliated by TRS’s contacts with her co-workers, family, and associates.”);
Forrest Wilder, Report: Texas Payday Lenders and Prosecutors Team Up to Criminally Pursue
Borrowers, TEX. OBSERVER (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.texasobserver.org/report-texas-paydaylenders-prosecutors-team-criminally-pursue-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/V72L-MM8B] (After finding
out a payday lender had filed a bad-check complaint against her, Margaret Jones, a seventy-one-yearold, whose income was from monthly social security checks, said: “I was just terrified to the point that I
couldn’t eat, my blood pressure went up . . . I was just nervous, scared.”).
229. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 223 (reporting about several federal
enforcement actions filed against companies engaged in unlawful debt collection practices, including
coercing consumers into paying phantom debts); Johnson, supra note 7, at 28 (discussing an FTC lawsuit
against a company that added unlawful fees, including up to $200 in bogus legal fees, to payday loan debts
and intimidated consumers into paying these grossly inflated debts by using threats of arrest); Cash
Advance Group - Payday Loan Debt Collection Scam, WA DEP’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumer/alerts/cash-advance-group-payday-loan-debt-collection-scam [https://
perma.cc/FB9G-ADR2] (warning from the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions about
a group of entities operating a payday lending debt scam where some consumers fell prey to threats of
arrests contained in fake arrest warrants attached to email messages sent to the consumers).
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borrowers,230 RTO customers,231 and car title borrowers have all been arrested as
a result of actions initiated by creditors and have suffered immediate
consequences, such as loss of employment.232
Besides the harm to individual consumers, taxpayer dollars subsidize the
misappropriation of resources when law enforcement and prosecutors act as debt
collectors and repo men for creditors.233 Janellen Edwards’ prosecution ordeal,
which transpired over several months, demonstrates this waste of law
enforcement and judicial resources as result of TRS Home Furnishings’
criminalization tactics.234 Moreover, creditors are shifting the costs of their
230. See, e.g., Abby Jackson, 7 Deputy US Marshals Reportedly Arrested a Guy Over a $1,500 Student
Loan He Took Out 29 Years Ago, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/canyou-get-arrested-for-having-student-loan-debt-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/4DPQ-B9AR].
231. See, e.g., David Rosen, 5 Scams and Rackets That Can Turn You Into a 21st-Century Indentured
Servant, ALTERNET (July 2, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/economy/americas-modern-debtors-prison
[https://perma.cc/B7J8-D7AJ] (identifying a RTO customer in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, who was
arrested for “felony theft by deception, felony theft of leased property and felony receiving stolen
property” after defaulting on payments for furniture and electronics obtained from a local Rent-ACenter store).
232. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 3 (stating that Antonio Walker was fired after he was arrested over
criminal charges stemming from debt involving RTO furniture even the charges were later dropped).
Because employers, landlords, and other organization (both public and private) obtain full background
checks on individual applicants for various reasons, arrest records routinely appear in databases even
when individuals are never charged with or convicted of a crime. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 71 n.334.
Such records are sometimes used to deny individuals employment, housing, licensing, and other services.
Id. Because the criminalization tactics discussed in this article can lead to unlawful arrests that appear in
background check databases, state lawmakers have another reason to pass laws penalizing creditors who
engage in such tactics.
233. For example, instead of police officers going to Ms. Edwards’ workplace to give her a citation
over a dispute about the furniture, these limited law enforcement resources would have been better
utilized investigating crimes, such as drug dealing and human trafficking, not acting as repo men for RTO
companies. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70,
at ¶ 18 (stating that a “TRS employee contacted the police, and caused a police officer to come to
plaintiff’s workplace”); See also supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text (explaining why TRS was
found civilly liable for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress). Similarly,
judges and prosecutors, who are already burdened with heavy criminal case loads, should be devoting
taxpayer-funded resources to seeking justice for victims of actual crimes, not serving as debt collectors
for RTO companies and payday lenders.
234. From the moment TRS employees filed a police report, which an officer later testified was based
on false information supplied by TRS employees, law enforcement and judicial resources began to be
wasted. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at
¶ 2. Ms. Edwards repeatedly appeared in court due to TRS’s false allegations. Throughout this entire
process, the judge had to oversee the hearings, the bailiff had to be present, and other members of the
court, such as the stenographer, had to use resources to record the hearings that were based on lies about
Ms. Edwards. Much time was taken to depose Ms. Edwards, TRS employees, and others. Additionally,
Ms. Edwards testified that she eventually quit her job in real estate due to the events that occurred with
TRS. Id. at 15–16. Due to the help of a criminal law attorney, the charges against her were dropped.
However, the use of judicial resources did not end because she, rightly so, filed a civil lawsuit against TRS
for its numerous violations of consumer protection laws. Two years later, Ms. Edwards won her civil case,
which proved that TRS not only violated consumer protection laws, but also set in motion an ordeal that
was a waste of both law enforcement and judicial resources. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial, supra note 84, at 1 (stating “at the conclusion of the four day
jury trial, plaintiff Janellen Edwards prevailed on all of her claims for relief”). All these resources were
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improvident lending practices onto private citizens who use their money to bail
consumers out of jail, and non-profit organizations that are compelled to aid
consumers victimized by criminalization tactics.235 If consumers cannot borrow
money from their relatives or friends, they are sometimes forced to use exempt
income sources to pay off debts and seek out government-sponsored programs,
such as food stamps, and non-profit organizations to help them survive.236
It is time for the United States to take serious steps to protect consumers from
criminalization tactics. Along with urging that creditors be prosecuted for
committing extortion, this article proposes several additional solutions, the first
of which is to limit the use of civil contempt.
A. Bright Line Test To Limit Misuse Of Civil Contempt
Statutes that permit arrest warrants in civil contempt cases should be
amended to limit when a creditor can even request a hearing to discover assets.
This proposed amendment would then make it very unlikely that the creditor
would be able to obtain an arrest warrant against a person sued for defaulting on
a consumer loan.
Consider Illinois’s recent attempt to limit when an arrest warrant can be
issued. Even though the Illinois constitution generally bans incarceration of
individuals over civil debts,237 creditors had been accused of regularly abusing the
civil contempt process to have consumers arrested in violation of the
constitution.238 In July of 2012, Governor Pat Quinn signed into law a bill,
referred to as the Debtors’ Rights Act.239 It requires, among other things, the
creditor to personally serve the individual debtor with a Citation to Discover
Assets along with an “Income and Asset Form.”240 According to a press release
wasted simply because a rent-to-own company wanted to quickly get paid in full rather than file a civil
lawsuit and take the long and lawful route to collect a civil debt.
235. See, e.g., supra note 121 (discussing Wakita Shaw, who stayed in jail until her mother could find
someone to borrow from in order to pay the full bail amount to obtain Ms. Shaw’s freedom).
236. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 148, at 1536 (explaining why consumers may use exempted income
sources to post bail to be released from jail); BRIAN T. MELZER ET AL., SPILLOVERS FROM COSTLY
CREDIT 4 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies No. CES-WP-11, 2013), http://www.kellogg.
northwestern.edu/faculty/melzer/Papers/Spillovers_from_Costly_Credit_04_11_2013.pdf (finding that
families living in areas that have local access to payday loans were 20% more likely to use food stamps
and confirming “that the effect of payday lending on food stamp receipt grows through time, as does
payday loan availability”). See generally ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., HOUSEHOLD FOOD
SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2014 4–8 (2015), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1896841/
err194.pdf (reporting statistical data about the frequency of use of food pantries and soup kitchens by
families experiencing food insecurity).
237. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt unless he refuses to deliver
up his estate for the benefit of his creditors as provided by law or unless there is a strong presumption of
fraud.”).
238. See Greco & Hammer, supra note 131.
239. See Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan: New Laws Ban Sending Debtors to
Prison for Debts, Protect Consumers from High Costs of Refund Anticipation Loans (July 25, 2012),
http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2012_07/20120725.html [https://perma.cc/U7S9-S92W].
240. See Public Act 97-0848; 735 ILCS 5/2–1402(a) (2014).
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issued upon its passage, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan proclaimed that
it was time to end the “illegal abuses” of the judicial system by creditors who
manipulate the court system to “extract money from the unemployed” and from
those too poor to pay their debts.241
Unfortunately, the act does not afford consumer debtors any free legal
representation and takes for granted that consumers will understand the required
notices and be able to complete the Income and Asset Form in a timely manner
to prove which assets and income sources are exempt from attachment.242 The
Illinois law will most likely result in the arrest of consumers who fail to comply
with all the law’s provisions, including the timely submission of the required
form.243 Moreover, even if an arrest warrant is not issued, the entire discovery
process will waste judicial resources in cases involving high-cost lenders, such as
the ones described in this article.
Rather than putting the burden on consumers to comprehend legal
documents and respond in a timely manner, lawmakers should implement a
bright-line rule based on the loan’s initial APR and the consumer debtor’s
income. If the creditor or debt collector is seeking to collect on a credit
transaction with an effective APR at the time of origination of more than thirtysix percent, the creditor or debt collector should be denied any request for a
hearing to discover assets unless it first demonstrates (from the consumer’s credit
application or pay stub) that the consumer is an above-median-income debtor for
his or her family size.244 This bright-line test would also include loan contracts
241. Greco & Hammer, supra note 131. Ms. Madigan stated that “the new law codifies and clarifies
practices followed by attorneys, creditors and courts across Illinois to ensure that courts make a finding
of a consumer’s ability to pay before entering a payment order, and it prohibits payment orders that rely
on legally protected income and prevents arrest warrants from being issued unless the debtor was
personally served with a hearing notice.” See Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, supra note 239.
242. Greco & Hammer, supra note 131, at 136 (explaining that “the new legislation does not create
any additional statutory exemptions; rather, it merely serves to highlight debtors’ rights to assert
exemptions that have existed for years”).
243. Although I represented creditors during most of my private practice experience, I had the
fortune to represent consumer debtors at Neighborhood Legal Services Association in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Based on my experience, I do not believe the majority of consumer–debtors would be able
to determine on their own all that is required under Illinois’ amended law to avoid civil contempt.
Moreover, it is well-documented that the majority of consumers who qualify for legal aid representation
are unable to actually receive pro bono service. KUEHNHOFF & CHING, supra note 135, at 1 (“Nationally,
because of lack of resources, legal aid programs must turn away more than half of the eligible people who
seek their assistance.”). As a result, it is fundamentally unfair to leave consumers who are likely to be in
financial trouble to fend for themselves against highly experienced lawyers that represent creditors.
244. The author’s idea for relying on the debtor’s median income came from the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, enacted in 2005. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA]. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)
(2006). For an overview of the means test, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Means Testing, DOJ (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing [https://perma.cc/DU3A-TTMV] (the heart of BAPCPA is the
means test, which is set forth in § 707(b)). See 151 Cong. Rec. S1726-01, S1779 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). Instead of the pre-BAPCPA case-by-case analysis of a debtor’s ability
to pay, Congress adopted the means test as a uniform mechanically-applied formula and intended that
most above-median income debtors be required to file for Chapter 13 relief, not Chapter 7, and pay back
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that have a default interest rate of thirty-six percent or higher, or a contract that
allows the creditor to charge both a default interest rate and late charges. These
contract terms would allow creditors to essentially get away with charging
already-struggling consumers double the original loan principal.245
The justification for a bright-line test is based on documented financial data
about consumers who rely on high-cost credit. Payday lenders, car title lenders,
RTO dealers, and some installment lenders issue credit with effective APRs
amounting to triple-digit, and sometimes quadruple-digit, interest rates.246 Plus
their business models are founded on lending to consumers with no savings, lower
incomes, and less assets.247 Therefore, it is fair to put the burden on creditors to
prove a consumer debtor has above-median income before it can even request a
hearing to discover assets.

some of their unsecured debts via a Chapter 13 plan. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M.
White, Catching Can–Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665,
677–83 (2005). See also Wieland v. Thomas, 382 B.R. 793, 796, 798 (D. Kan. 2008) (The purpose of
BAPCPA was to “ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford,” and “[t]hat purpose
is best achieved by applying the means test in such a manner that the debtor’s actual financial
circumstances—i.e., what the debtor can actually afford to repay creditors—are represented”). The
starting point of this uniform mechanically-applied formula is to first determine whether the debtor has
an above-median income for his or her household size in the state where the household resides. See 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 10 (Bankr. D.C. 2007) (“A presumption of abuse under
the means test of § 707(b)(2) can only arise if the debtor is an above-median income debtor.”). Because
Congress has already adopted the means test, which presumes the ability of above-median-income
debtors to be capable of paying back the minimum amount of debt, the author’s proposal of a bright-line
test is reasonable in that it would require a high-cost lender or debt collector to prove the consumer
debtor has above-median income before seeking discovery against the consumer debtor.
245. Advocates and scholars have already determined that these and similar contract terms are
predatory and need to be banned or curtailed. See, e.g., Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending
Prevention Project: Prescribing a Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 1, 30–31 (2000) (explaining that “once a loan has been identified as a high-cost loan, the following
limitations and prohibitions apply: a) the lender may not unilaterally accelerate the indebtedness, except
upon default of the borrower; b) the loan may not contain any payment that is more than double the
regular monthly payment, thus effectively preventing balloon payments; c) the loan may not provide for
negative amortization; d) the interest rate may not be increased following default; e) the lender cannot
require more than two payments to be paid in advance; f) no loan may be consummated unless the
borrower receives approved housing counseling; g) no loan may be extended unless the lender
‘reasonably’ believes that the borrower will be able to repay the loan; h) financing of fees or charges
payable to third parties is prohibited; i) a lender may not charge fees in connection with the refinancing
of prior loans with the borrower; and j) payments to home improvement contractors must be jointly
payable to the borrower or payable to a third-party escrow agent”). I am not arguing for a ban on default
interest rates but that high-cost lenders with such terms should not be able to request oral hearings to
discover assets unless they have independent evidence that the consumer has above-median income to
justify invoking this post-judgment remedy.
246. See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014)
(holding that defendants’ so-called “signature loans” marketed in the State of New Mexico were
unconscionable and holding that it “is grossly unreasonable and against public policy to offer installment
loans at 1,147.14 to 1,500 percent interest [rates]”). See also supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
247. See also supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (stating also that the consumer’s income is
likely from a protected income source (for example, child support payments)).
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Because creditors usually obtain proof of income (for example, copies of pay
stubs) prior to credit approval,248 it would be easy for a creditor to determine
whether a consumer debtor’s household income is above the median. 249 Once the
creditor proves that the income is above the median, the court would then have
concrete financial information that may indicate the debtor has the ability to pay.
At that point, the creditor would be able to request that the debtor complete an
asset/income form like the one required in Illinois. If that form indicates that the
debtor has non-exempt income sources or unencumbered, non-exempt personal
property, only then should the creditor be allowed to request a hearing for oral
examination. Imposing these restrictions on creditors would prevent them from
being able to abuse the civil contempt process as a pretext for getting arrest
warrants and thereby limit their ability to waste judicial resources in cases
involving exorbitantly priced consumer credit.
B. States Should Ban Payday Lenders From Attempting To Have Their
Customers Arrested
Although the above proposed limitations on the use of civil contempt would
apply to all high-cost lenders, payday lenders need additional restrictions placed
on them to deter criminalization practices. The payday lending industry is rife
with regulation-evading companies; therefore, payday lenders should be
completely banned from seeking civil contempt orders against consumers or
having them criminally prosecuted. Furthermore, if caught doing so, payday
lenders should be held liable for actual and punitive damages. The proposed ban
and monetary liability would apply to any company or debt buyer attempting to
collect a payday loan debt.

248. See, e.g., In re Marquardt, 561 B.R. 715, 726 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that the consumer’s
payday loan debt would be discharged in his bankruptcy case, the court noted that because payday
lenders, including Americash, “charge interest rates upwards of 400%,” and “make these loans based on
little more than proof of income,” they “are almost never justified in relying on a debtor’s assurances of
repayment”); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1, 9 (2002) (explaining the payday loan process, which includes the customer providing proof of income);
Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41, 62 (2012) (describing the results of a study of car title
lenders in New Mexico and stating that most lenders require proof of an income source); Press Release,
Rent-A-Center, New Campaign Promotes Credit-Free Alternatives (Nov. 24, 2008), http://
media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/90/90764/Rent-A-Center%20Press%20Release.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/DG2U-GXHX] (claiming to be free of credit checks, Rent-A-Center nevertheless requires that
applicants offer proof of an income source).
249. Because the means test under BAPCPA requires a determination that the debtor’s income is
above the median income for his or her household size, see supra note 244 for further discussion, median
income figures are readily available for a creditor to review. See 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS § 10:13 (2016) (“The median family income numbers are taken from U.S. Census Bureau
tables for each state, based upon the number of persons in the household. The Census Bureau regularly
updates its tables, with an adjustment for cost of living increase based on the Consumer Price Index, and
those tables for a current year are found at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/bapcpa.”).
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Payday lenders should be singled out for several reasons. First, several states
have passed laws in the last decade to curb payday loan borrowing.250 However,
the payday loan industry has largely remained unaffected by these laws because
of its ability to exploit loopholes.251 In Ohio, for example, payday lenders have
found a way to skirt an APR cap of twenty-eight percent and now charge interest
rates higher than the triple-digit interest rates allowed under a pre-2008 law.252
Although the industry’s trade association has taken the position that its
members should not threaten or initiate criminal prosecution,253 this positon
appears to be mere window dressing, especially in light of the fact that state and

250. Despite states being characterized as either red or blue, the trend in the United States is for
voters and lawmakers to favor limiting payday lending. For example, on the same day that the majority
of South Dakota residents voted to elect Donald Trump as president, an even larger percentage of voters
approved a law capping interest rates on payday and car title loans at 36%. See Ashlee Kieler, South
Dakotans Vote To Cap Payday, Auto-Title Loan Interest Rates At 36%, Consumerist, CONSUMERIST
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/11/09/ south-dakotans-vote-to-cap-payday-auto-title-loaninterest-rates-at-36/ [https://perma.cc/4VT6-GXMB] (stating that seventy-six percent voted for a ballot
initiative capping interest rates). See also Timothy Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps,
State Legislation, and Public Opinion: Does The Law Reflect The Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 115, 116–18 (2014) (discussing ballot initiatives in several states and stating that interest-rate caps
on payday loans were approved by voters in the red states of Arizona and Montana).
251. See, e.g., James v. National Financial, LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 834 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that
defendant’s extremely high-cost loan was unconscionable and stating that “the most critical aspect of the
bargaining environment was the purpose and effect of the Loan Agreement, which was to evade
[Delaware’s] Payday Loan Law”).
252. In 2008, voters in Ohio overwhelmingly voted to ratify a state law reducing the then legalized
interest rates on payday loans from 391% to 28%. See, e.g., Payday Lenders Need a Firm Federal Hand
and State Oversight, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 2, 2016), 2016 WLNR 26826317. Payday lenders,
however, simply exploited a never-before-used law to charge consumers interest rates as high as 718%.
Id.; Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog Is on a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its
Authority to Declare Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381,
396–27 (2012) (describing how payday lenders in several states, including Ohio, circumvent key
provisions of newly enacted state laws and proposing that the CFPB ban certain payday-loan terms,
including balloon payments and short maturity dates). In addition to evading state laws, payday lenders
have been sanctioned for violating federal bankruptcy law by, among other things, violating the
automatic stay, which is a temporary injunction that bars creditors from contacting debtors directly to
get them to pay pre-bankruptcy debts. See, e.g., In re Snowden, 769 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding
the bankruptcy court’s imposition of punitive damages on a payday lender for willfully violating the
automatic stay by several unlawful practices, including repeatedly calling the medical facility where the
consumer debtor worked as nurse to get her to pay a pre-bankruptcy loan).
253. The Community Financial Services Association of America, the national trade association for
the industry, has created for its members a list of “best practices,” including the practice of members not
pursuing criminal action against their borrowers. CFSA Member Best Practices, COMMUNITY FIN.
SERVS. ASSOC. AM., http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx#sthash.DZx2UiyP.dpu [https://
perma.cc/JNK5-6EHE] (last visited Aug. 4, 2016) (including a “No Criminal Action” practice, which
states that “[a] member will not threaten or pursue criminal action against a customer as a result of the
customer’s check being returned unpaid or the customer’s account not being paid”). However, it is clear
that some lenders are not following this best practice. See, e.g., Catherine Dunn, Group Warns of Debtors’
Prison Tactics Among Texas Payday Lenders, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.ibtimes
.com/group-warns-debtors-prison-tactics-among-texas-payday-lenders-1763720 (stating that over 1,500
criminal complaints have been filed by payday lenders in Texas alone).
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federal enforcement actions prove criminalization practices are rampant among
payday lenders and their debt-collection agents.254
In several states that authorize payday lending, a consumer cannot be
prosecuted, at least in theory, based solely on the fact that the consumer’s postdated check was returned (or a debit authorization to the consumer’s account
was denied) due to insufficient funds.255 This protection was incorporated into
some payday lending statutes because in the early days of payday lending
consumers were being prosecuted for passing bad checks despite the fact that the
payday lenders were not victims of a crime.256 To obtain a conviction for passing
a bad check, the prosecution needs to show not only that the defendant gave the
payee a check knowing his or her account had insufficient funds, but that the
payee also lacked knowledge that the account had insufficient funds.257 Payday
lenders, as payees on post-dated checks, are not victims of a crime because they
know at the time a consumer applies for loan approval that the consumer’s
account lacks sufficient funds.258 Therefore, the lender only has a civil claim for
breach of contract. No consumer should be prosecuted under those
circumstances.
Consider again Wakita Shaw’s case, where the payday lender knew, or should
have known, as a business licensed to operate in Missouri, that the payday loan
statute banned the bad-check prosecution of consumers unable to pay loans
obtained with post-dated checks.259 The payday lender was, however, violating
the spirit of this consumer protection provision by misusing civil contempt to
have consumers like Wakita Shaw arrested.
Similarly, when Cash Biz and other payday lenders in Texas filed criminal
charges against hundreds of consumers who had defaulted on their loans, the
lenders knew, or should have known, that the Texas constitution prohibits
incarceration of individuals over debts, and that a state regulation provides that
254. See infra notes 260–263 and accompanying text. When payday lending started in the late 1990s,
consumer–borrowers had to give lenders post-dated checks in order to obtain loans. Johnson, Payday
Loans, supra 248, at 71. If the consumer’s check bounced due to insufficient funds, payday lenders often
filed criminal complaints that accused consumers of the crime of passing a bad check. Id. Even though
many lenders no longer require a physical post-dated check, those that practice criminalization practices
will nevertheless accuse the customer of passing a bad check if the attempted debit to the customer’s
account is denied due to insufficient funds. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7.
255. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 42–47 (discussing the criminalization tactics of Goldman
Schwartz, a company that was a debt collector for several payday lenders, including Ace Cash Express,
the nation’s second largest payday lender).
256. Id. at 16.
257. Id. See, e.g., Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tenn., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051
(M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Tennessee law forbids prosecution of a person who issues a check which ‘the payee
or holder knows or has good and sufficient reason to believe the drawer did not have sufficient funds on
deposit to the drawer’s credit with the drawee to ensure payment.”).
258. Turner, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (holding that “it is reasonable, logical, and predictable” that the
payday lender knows the consumer–borrower’s account has insufficient funds to cover the check and,
therefore, the lender is not the victim of a crime).
259. See VERNON’S ANN. MO. STAT. § 408.505(8); infra notes 260–262 and accompanying text.
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the lenders should only pursue prosecution when they have specific evidence of
a consumer committing forgery, fraud, theft, or some other criminal conduct.260
This imputed knowledge is why the Texas Office of the Consumer Credit
Commissioner fined Cash Biz261 and issued a bulletin warning all payday lenders
operating in Texas not to pursue criminal prosecution of consumers unless they
had specific evidence of forgery or other intentional unlawful conduct proving
the consumer’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.262
Even ACE Cash Express, the nation’s second largest payday lender, has been
sued for alleged criminalization practices. In 2014, ACE agreed to pay $10 million
to settle with the CFPB a lawsuit alleging numerous violations, including
allegations that ACE’s own employees and third-party debt collectors repeatedly
threatened consumers with criminal prosecution.263 Given the industry’s track
record of ignoring state and federal laws, payday lenders must be completely
barred from initiating criminal charges of any kind against consumers.
In addition to completely banning payday lenders from filing police reports
or criminal complaints, substantial liability should be imposed on lenders that
attempt to file criminal charges as well as on lenders that only threaten to do so.
Lenders found to have engaged in a pattern of criminalization practices should
be required to pay treble damages to each victim and should be subject to
punitive damages starting at $10,000 for each person victimized.264 Consumers
260. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.”). The Texas Finance
Code states: “a person may not threaten or pursue criminal charges against a consumer related to a check
or other debit authorization provided by the consumer as security for a transaction in the absence of
forgery, fraud, theft, or other criminal conduct.” TEX. FIN. CODE § 393.201(c)(3) (2012). See also TEX.
FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.301(a) (West 2006) (“In debt collection, a debt collector may not use threats,
coercion or attempts to coerce that employ any of the following practices ... [including] accusing falsely
or threatening to accuse falsely a person of fraud or any other crime.”).
261. Agreed Order, In Matter of Cash Zone LLC d/b/a Cash Biz, (Dec. 15, 2014) (No. L15-048)
(imposing a fine of $10,000 and ordering Cash Biz provide restitution to all consumers against whom it
had filed criminal complaints).
262. TEX. OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, CREDIT ACCESS BUSINESS ADVISORY
BULLETIN, FILING CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST CONSUMERS, (2013), http://occc.texas.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/disclosures/b13-9-cab-criminal-charges.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT2J-B3A9]. In
Texas, payday lenders are registered to operate as credit access businesses (CABs). The Bulletin warned
payday lenders or CABS that a post-dated check or debit authorization alone cannot be the basis for
prosecution and that lenders should not pursue prosecution of consumers “unless it has specific evidence”
of forgery, fraud, theft, or other criminal conduct. Id. (“Before threatening or pursuing a criminal charge,
a CAB should have specific evidence that the state can use to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt—that
a consumer knowingly violated a criminal law when entering the transaction.”).
263. Consent Order, In the Matter of ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008, 2014 WL
4472891 (July 10, 2014),; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against
ACE Case Express for Pushing Payday Borrowers Into a Cycle of Debt (July 10, 2014), http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-payd
ay-borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt/ [https://perma.cc/HA6K-E7LX] (uncovering a diagram in ACE’s
training manual that the CFPB alleges was used to trap consumers in a cycle of indebtedness).
264. Starting with a punitive damages award at $10,000 seems fair given that consumers in a successful
litigation can obtain that amount under applicable laws. Several federal and state statutes limit the
amount of punitive damages in a single lawsuit. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (Equal Credit Opportunity
Act) (“Any creditor, . . . who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall
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who prevail against lenders should also be allowed to recover the cost of
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Finally, mandatory arbitration and class-action waiver clauses in payday loan
contracts should be declared unenforceable by lenders that engage in
criminalization practices. Cash Biz is the poster child for why these clauses should
be unenforceable. After a class-action lawsuit was filed against it for numerous
state law violations, including filing over 400 criminal complaints against its
customers, Cash Biz invoked its contractual arbitration clauses and class-action
waiver provisions to avoid being held civilly liable on a large scale.265 A payday
lender’s duplicitous conduct—using the criminal justice system to accuse its
customers of crimes and then fighting to keep those same customers out of civil
court—should be disallowed to deter the lender from using criminalization
tactics.
In light of the industry’s ability to earn billions by ignoring state laws passed
to end the payday loan debt cycle,266 no reason exists for payday lenders to cease
using criminalization tactics on their own. In short, the above-proposed measures
should make the cost of doing wrong increase to the degree that payday lenders
are motivated to do right by complying with applicable laws. Passage of a multifaceted solution is necessary to protect consumers from payday lenders that
engage in criminalization practices.

be liable to the aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an amount not greater than $10,000, in
addition to any actual damages provided in subsection (a) of this section, except that in the case of a class
action the total recovery under this subsection shall not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of
the net worth of the creditor.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1787.3 (capping punitive damages at $10,000).
265. Despite the fact that Texas already has a law applicable to payday lenders that severely limits
when a consumer can be prosecuted for passing a bad check, Cash Biz filed criminal complaints lacking
any legal grounds for prosecution against hundreds of consumers. See supra notes 260–262 and
accompanying text. The state regulator imposed on Cash Biz a $10,000 fine and a restitution order. See
supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text. With such a small fine, it is reasonable to conclude that Cash
Biz’s profits exceeded the fine imposed. Why is that so? Because this company had developed a
reputation for seeking criminal prosecution, some consumers who received only verbal threats from Cash
Biz would have paid outstanding loans, even in amounts exceeding what they owed. After being sued for
its criminalization tactics in a class action lawsuit, Cash Biz defended on the basis that the consumers had
to arbitrate individually due to mandatory arbitration and class-action wavier provisions in their loan
contracts. See Cash Biz, LP v. Henry, No. 04–15–00469–CV, 2016 WL 4013794, at *1, 8 (Tex. App.–San
Antonio July 27, 2016). The majority of the appellate court ruled in Cash Biz’s favor, thereby compelling
consumers to arbitrate in individual cases. But see id. at 8 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority and stating that Cash Biz did sufficiently invoke the judicial process, and thereby waived its right
to arbitration, because “[b]y submitting the sworn complaints, Cash Biz not only procured the
prosecution, it became a ‘witness’ in the criminal prosecution, i.e., a person who presented personal
knowledge of the borrowers’ purported criminal conduct”).
266. See, e.g., Policy Brief, Center for Responsible Lending, Payday and Car Title Lenders Drain $8
Billion in Fees (Jan. 2017), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/researchpublication/crl_statebystate_fee_drain_may2016_0.pdf (providing examples of payday lenders evading
state laws that cap interest rates on payday loans and explaining how lenders profit primarily from
consumers trapped in long-term debt, even though payday loans are marketed as short-term loans).
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C. Statutes That RTO Lenders Use To Have Consumers Arrested Should Be
Decriminalized
Along with curbing the criminalization practices of payday lenders, state
lawmakers must also stop the criminalization practices of RTO companies. The
RTO industry has, over the years, lobbied for passage of laws expanding the
definition of theft crimes to include fraudulent leasing of and failing to return
RTO property.267 These laws criminalize consumers who have defaulted on their
payments by making typical breach-of-contract behavior a crime.268 When law
enforcement and prosecutors do not actually understand the required mens rea,
consumers will be wrongfully arrested, prosecuted, and, sometimes, convicted for
simply breaching a contract.269 Thus, it is imperative that state lawmakers repeal
criminal statutes currently exploited by RTO companies to have customers
arrested.
Consider, as an example, a bill supported by RTO dealers and debated before
the Connecticut General Assembly. In 2006, RTO dealers in Connecticut tried
to expand a state law to criminalize customers who failed to pay their outstanding
debts.270 The assembly accepted testimony from RTO dealers.271 One dealer, Mr.
Brett Lagasse, testified that the law was necessary to curb losses to RTO
businesses and raised the ancillary issue of loss of tax revenue from customers.272
His testimony further implied that the proposed law would be used against
customers who have failed to pay for items rented only for commercial use, not
for personal or household use.273

267. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 57–58 (describing how RTO dealers in Florida lobbied state
lawmakers to expand the scope of a criminal statute that makes it a crime to fail to turn over possession
of RTO property).
268. Id. MultiState Associates is a firm of lobbyists that seeks passage of industry-friendly laws. See
Services, MULTISTATE ASSOCIATES, https://www.multistate.com/content/services [https://perma.cc/
9P7A-VWK8] (last visited June 26, 2016). It has compiled a fifty-state survey of theft-related crimes for
the American Rental Association. See also MULTISTATE ASSOCS., THEFT OF RENTAL SERVICES 50STATE SURVEY (2007), https://www.bipac.net/ararental/Theft_of_Rental_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A9W3-Z6BK].
269. See, e.g., Bert v. Commonwealth, No. 1499–10–1, 2011 WL 4916203, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18,
2011) (holding that intent to defraud “cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by [the
Commonwealth] merely showing that appellant failed to honor the terms of her lease agreement” and
reversing appellant’s conviction for failing to return a television); State v. Sanders, 905 So. 2d 241, 242–
43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the prosecution could not prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt merely by showing that the RTO customer failed to return RTO property after the company sent
her a certified letter demanding its return).
270. Hearing on H.B. 5611 Before the Gen. Assemb. Judiciary Comm. (Conn. Mar. 14, 2006),
transcript available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/juddata/chr/2006JUD00314-R001000-CHR.htm
[https://perma.cc/ A72L-YXR7].
271. Id. (“I offer an experience of frustration of being powerless to collect legitimate rental fees from
customers who fail to return my rental equipment on time. Each year I lose approximately ten to fifteen
thousand dollars in revenue due to these uncollectible late charges. And of course, as a result, the State
of Connecticut also loses its share of that revenue through its lost sales tax.”).
272. Id.
273. Id. (suggesting that his company provides a “valuable service to the public by offering equipment
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Contradicting Mr. Legasse’s characterization of the proposed bill, Raphael
Podolsky, a legal aid attorney with the Legal Assistance Resource Center of
Connecticut, testified that law could be used to impose criminal liability on all
customers, not just those renting for commercial purposes.274 He asserted that the
real purpose275 of the proposed law was to intimidate customers into paying
through fear of arrests:
House Bill 5611 . . . is about people who have returned [RTO] goods, but they owe something .
. . [T]he purpose of the bill is to make it possible to threaten them with arrest or to actually
arrest people. You should note that it applies to all leasing of goods . . . . This includes when
you go to the video store and rent a video, it includes a computer rental, a musical instrument
rental, whatever it is . . . It does have the capacity to turn the police into bill collectors. The
reality is that this is no different from any other kind of bill. We do not allow people to be
arrested because they are behind on a bill. And there is no reason to be carving out a special
exception for this industry.276

Apparently, persuaded by Mr. Poldosky and other consumer advocates, the
Connecticut General Assembly passed a version of the bill, later enacted, that
exempts from prosecution individuals who enter into rental agreements for
“personal, family or household purposes.”277
Similarly, consumer advocates in Virginia have successfully stopped the
prosecution of consumers for failing to return RTO goods.278 After arrests for
failing to return RTO property soared in Virginia,279 consumer advocates initially
made unsuccessful attempts to get politicians to repeal the Virginia statute that
made it a crime for a customer to fail to return rental property within ten days of

for construction, corporate meetings, weddings, parties, a limitless number of situations and items”).
274. Id.
275. Mr. Podolsky was not exaggerating when he stated that a person could be arrested for failing to
pay for something as small as a video rental. For instance, in South Carolina, a state that also has a law
criminalizing the failure to return rental property, a woman was arrested after failing to pay rental fees
at a video rental store. Philip Bantz, ‘Monster-In-Law’ VHS Arrest a PR Nightmare For Pickens County,
N.C. LAW. WEEKLY (Feb. 20, 2014), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2014/02/20/monster-in-law-vhs-arresta-pr-nightmare-for-pickens-county/ [https://perma.cc/35BM-S5PC]. For some reason not revealed to the
public, the sheriff decided to run Ms. Finley’s name through a criminal database and discovered an
outstanding warrant for her arrest for failing to return a VHS videotape of “Monster-In-Law,” which she
had rented nine years earlier. Id. He arrested Ms. Finley on the spot even though the video rental store
had been closed for a few years. Id. Ms. Finley spent the night in jail and was released the next day on a
$2,000 personal recognizance bond. Id. When TMZ caught wind of the story and reported it, the news
story went viral and the sheriff’s office received enormous negative media attention. Id. The owner of
the defunct store also heard about it and asked that the charges against Ms. Finley be dropped. Id. This
movie could not have been worth more than $20 at the time she rented it, yet she was charged with a
crime that carried a maximum fine $1,000 or 30 days in jail. Id.
276. Hearing on H.B. 5611, supra note 270.
277. See CONN. GEN. STATUTES ANN. § 53a–126b (defining “criminal trover in the second degree”).
278. See infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Heather Sullivan, Convictions rise for merchandise renters who default, LIVE 5 NEWS
(2011), http://www.live5news.com/story/15961694/convictions-rise-for-merchandise-renters-who-default
[https://perma.cc/ENR8-XMPL] (stating that the number of convictions rose from thirty-three in 2008 to
fifty-three in 2010). For example, Antonio Walker, mentioned in the introduction, lost his job after he
was arrested for allegedly failing to return RTO property. Hansen, supra note 3.
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the owner making a demand for its return.280 Then, in 2014, a businessman sought
to make the law even more punitive by expanding the criminal penalties for
failing to return RTO property. Consumer advocates, seeing this as the chance to
push for stronger protection of RTO consumers, struck a compromise that gave
the businessman what he wanted281 but that resulted in an amended statute that
exempts consumers who sign RTO contracts from prosecution.282 Consumer
advocates then started a campaign to educate prosecutors and public defenders
about the change in the law.283 As a result, honest RTO customers who initially
make RTO payments but later suffer a financial setback no longer need to fear
prosecution in Virginia.
Unfortunately, most states still have theft statutes that RTO companies can
rely on to unlawfully terrorize consumers with threats of arrest or to unlawfully
initiate criminal action to have them arrested.284 State lawmakers, therefore, need
to amend theft statutes related to RTO property and exclude from prosecution
consumers who enter into RTO contracts for personal, family, or household use.
280. In 2013, advocates succeeded only in getting lawmakers to expand the time period to return
RTO property from ten to thirty days. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118 (West 2013) (amended by Act of
Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 56, 2014 Va. Acts 100).
281. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118(D). Subsection D is the provision that the businessman wanted
to add to the statute, and it reads as follows:
D. The court shall order a person found guilty of an offense under this section to make
restitution as the court deems appropriate to the lessor. Such restitution may include (i) the cost
of repairing such property; (ii) if the property is not returned or cannot reasonably be repaired,
the actual value of such property; and (iii) any reasonable loss of revenue by the lessor resulting
from the fraudulent conversion or removal of such property.
282. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118(A) (2014). It now reads as follows:
A. Whenever any person is in possession or control of any personal property, by virtue of or
subject to a written lease of such property, except property described in § 18.2-117 or in
the Virginia Lease-Purchase Agreement Act (§ 59.1-207.17 et seq.), and such person so in
possession or control shall, with intent to defraud, sell, secrete, or destroy the property, or
dispose of the property for his own use, or fraudulently remove the same from the
Commonwealth without the written consent of the lessor thereof, or fail to return such
property to the lessor thereof within 30 days after expiration of the lease or rental period
for such property stated in such written lease, he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny
thereof.
(emphasis added in underline).
283. See, e.g., Jeremy P. White Is Legal Aid Award Recipient, VA. STATE BAR (Apr. 30, 2015), http://
m.vsb.org/site/news/item/white_legal_aid_award_0415 [https://perma.cc/4LED-2DTF] (announcing that
Attorney Jeremy White, who also trains other attorneys, was honored for his various legal activities,
including working with the Virginia Legal Aid Society and lawyers with the Virginia Poverty Law Center
to obtain “a repeal of the Virginia Code section that permitted owners of rent-to-own furniture stores to
criminally charge customers who fell behind on their payments”); Rent-To-Own Stores Can No Longer
Use Prosecutors as their Debt Collectors, VA. POVERTY L. CTR. (July 9, 2014), http://www.vplc.org/rentto-own-stores-can-no-longer-use-prosecutors-as-their-debt-collectors
[https://perma.cc/NY8B-4ZBS]
(educating the public that RTO customers can no longer be prosecuted for failing to return RTO
property).
284. See also supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text (describing how a RTO customer in Oregon
was unlawfully arrested and charged with a crime after the RTO company’s employees falsely
represented that she refused to make any payments). See also THEFT OF RENTAL SERVICES 50-STATE
SURVEY, supra note 268.
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Moreover, consumer protection laws need to be amended to severely penalize
RTO companies that resort to criminalization tactics.285
VI
CONCLUSION
Whether lenders engage in criminalization tactics that actually initiate
criminal prosecution or merely threaten to do so, they have every incentive to
continue such practices, especially when they are successful in getting consumers
to relinquish ownership of assets or to pay phantom debts or amounts far in
excess of what they owe. Similar to consumers subjected to criminal prosecution,
consumers who are victimized by a creditor’s misuse of civil contempt are in a
legally precarious situation. Like Ms. Shaw, they are sitting in
jail without the ability to get a court-appointed attorney and must post the full
amount of the required bail to be released from jail.286
Lawmakers will do a great service to vulnerable consumers by implementing
the above-proposed solutions to deter payday lenders, car title lenders, debt
collection companies, and any other creditors from employing criminalization
tactics against consumers. Although the proposal did not cover every type of
high-cost lender that resorts to criminalization tactics, state lawmakers could
adopt some of the proposed solutions by imposing stiff financial penalties on such
lenders287 and decriminalizing theft-related statutes,288 thereby preventing state
laws from being used to arrest or prosecute consumers.
Until state legislatures decide to act, it is imperative that state and local law
enforcement pursue prosecution of creditors for extortion. Rather than blaming
consumers for their predicaments,289 prosecutors should focus on the culpability
285. The same proposed liability recommended for deterring payday lenders should also be
implemented against RTO companies that engage in criminalization practices. See supra notes 267–269
and accompanying text (proposing that lawmakers require courts to impose treble and punitive damages
against payday lenders and make their arbitration and class-action wavier clauses unenforceable).
286. See, e.g., supra notes 114–33 (describing how a payday lender’s use of civil contempt led to the
arrest of Ms. Shaw, who stayed in jail until her mother could find someone to borrow money from in
order to pay the full bail amount to obtain Ms. Shaw’s release from jail).
287. See, e.g., supra note 264 and accompanying text (proposing that if a payday lender is found liable
for threatening or initiating criminal prosecution against a consumer, the lender should be liable for
treble and punitive damages, along with attorneys’ fees).
288. See, e.g., supra notes 276–282 and accompanying text (explaining how consumer advocates in
Connecticut and Virginia were able to get legislation passed exempting RTO customers from criminal
prosecution if the RTO property is obtained for personal, family or household use).
289. The United States has a culture of blaming victims in numerous contexts. See generally Jon
Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 413 (2006). The rape victim was “asking for it” because she was wearing provocative
clothing. See, e.g., Alinor C. Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic
Meanings of Women’s Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87 (1995). See also Susan D.
Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining the Otherwise Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 28 (2007) (Victim blaming is not intended to be cruel but is a way of protecting
oneself from feeling vulnerable: “Rather than feeling vulnerable, we prefer to imagine that the victim is
to blame.”).
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of the alleged extortionists and prosecute when evidence reveals guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.290 Such prosecutions vindicate consumers and simultaneously
send the message that extortion is not a lawful way to collect debts from
consumers even if they are validly owed.291
Poor, nameless consumers deserve to be protected from extortion just as
much as rich, famous victims like David Letterman. He could meet with
prosecutors in New York and know that he would not hear: “you got what you
deserve for cheating on your wife.”292 Robert Halderman was investigated for
and charged with attempted larceny by extortion because he demanded $2
million from Letterman in exchange for not revealing Letterman’s past sexual
relationships with female staffers.293 Letterman could have easily paid the money
demanded, but he chose not. Moreover, he had the financial resources to hire the
best lawyers to advise him on the best course of action.
Unlike David Letterman, vulnerable consumers and their families usually
cannot afford an attorney, and they are coerced into complying with creditors’
demands, thereby suffering great financial harm.294 When a consumer victimized
by criminalization practices makes a payment, it does not prove the legitimacy of
the debt owed or that the consumer had the means to pay all along.295 To the
contrary, payment only proves that the creditor perceived the consumer’s
vulnerability and exploited it by threatening criminal prosecution or exposure of
the consumer’s indebtedness. The consumer’s vulnerability, coupled with a
desperation to avoid going to or to get out of jail, means the consumer will comply
with the creditors demand by relinquishing possession of their assets and paying
off the debt, sometimes using exempted funds or money borrowed from others.
Instead of blaming the victims, we should collectively agree with the district
attorney’s public pronouncement promoting equal treatment: “New York City
will not tolerate the coercion or extortion of anyone, be the victim rich or poor,
famous or anonymous. The law prohibits conduct like defendant’s and attaches
severe penalties to it. We intend to enforce the law.”296 It is time to enforce the
290. See, e.g., supra notes 20–34 (describing a compelling example of extortion based on an explicit
threat where a repo man handed a consumer a written document stating that she would be arrested and
quoting an entire section of the criminal code she purportedly violated by not relinquishing possession
of her car to the repo man).
291. People v. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
292. See Alicia Maxey Greene, News Release, N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Oct. 2. 2009), https://
web.archive.org/web/20091005175911/http://manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2009-10-2.shtml [https://
perma.cc/37NF-DZLB].
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text (stating that a payday loan borrower,
Wakita Shaw, had to borrow money to get her out of jail, and then, a few months later, Ms. Shaw herself
filed bankruptcy).
295. See, e.g., supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text; Johnson, supra note 7 (describing several
examples of consumers who paid phantom payday loan debts because the debt collection companies used
the consumers’ sensitive information (for example, social security numbers) to convince them that they
owed the debts and that they would be immediately arrested if they failed to pay).
296. Id. (statement by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau).
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law against creditors that use criminalization tactics to terrorize consumers into
paying civil debts or relinquishing their assets.

